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INTRODUCTION
Images of scorched villages and corpses in the Rakhine State of western
Myanmar appeared in mainstream Western news outlets in 2017, catapulting the
country onto the world stage. These images were of the Rohingya People, a
Muslim minority indigenous to Myanmar’s Rakhine State, facing extrajudicial
killings perpetrated by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). While many
20th-century genocides have been sparked by a singular event or dictatorial
demand, the Rohingya Genocide is a popular movement built on an extreme
expression of Burmese identity. Whether seen through a civic, ethnic, national,
racial, or religious lens, contemporary Burmese identity began with the Bamar
ethnolinguistic majority crafting a Burmese identity to unite themselves against
perceived ethnic minority oppressors during British rule. To hinder the political
and economic influence of ethnic minorities, Bamar nationalists conceived
“Burmese-ness” to be along the lines of an established Bamar identity. Thus, to
understand the causes of the Rohingya Genocide, it is necessary to look for its
roots in the development of a national identity based on religion and ethnicity in
Myanmar’s colonial past.
The killings and forced displacement of Rohingya minorities did not
happen overnight but are the culmination of a propaganda campaign that defined
Burmese identity by articulating that the Rohingya are not Burmese. Vernacular
newspaper articles under such headlines as “Muslims Are Not the Union Born
Indigenous Citizens,” from 2016, characterize Burmese identity as being Buddhist
and subscribing to the Bamar government’s ethnonationalist rhetoric by arguing
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that Rohingya Muslims are neither indigenous nor citizens.1 The government of
Myanmar does not even recognize the term “Rohingya” and billboards with antiRohingya messages such as “protest against US embassy use of the fake term
‘Rohingya Community’” are a call for mass action to erase Rohingya identity.2
Myanmar’s government officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups, some of whom
wage insurgencies against the state, yet the Myanmar government distinctly refers
to the Rohingya officially as “Bengalis.”3 By calling the Rohingya “Bengali,” the
Myanmar government characterizes them as “Indian” and manufactures the lie
that the Rohingya are not from the Rakhine State but “Bengal” in today’s
northeast India. As a result, the Rohingya are thought to not be entitled to hold
Burmese citizenship or receive legal protection. This raises the question of why
the characterization of the Rohingya as South Asian makes them appear different,
other, and alien to the Burmese to such a degree that they cannot even receive
recognition as an indigenous ethnic group. Why does Burmese identity appear to
include a phobia of South Asians?
The majority of Myanmar’s population views Burmese identity as
distinctly incompatible with Rohingya identity. Although traditionally arbiters for
peace, Buddhist monks called pongyis are among the leading inciters of antiRohingya sentiment, with one monk, U Thu Min Gala, charging that “[t]hey [the
Rohingya] stole our land, our food and our water. We will never accept them

1

“Burma’s Path to Genocide,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d.
Ibid.
3
Gregory B. Poling, “Separating Fact from Fiction about Myanmar’s Rohingya” (Center for
Strategic & International Studies, February 13, 2014). The word “Bengali” refers to a person from
Bengal, a geographic region covering Bangladesh and the Republic of India’s state of West
Bengal.
2
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back.”4 Even Myanmar’s internationally-beloved pro-democracy leader, Aung
San Suu Kyi, defended the actions of the Tatmadaw before the United Nations.
The widespread Burmese antipathy toward the Rohingya is the product of a
Burmese identity defined by what the Burmese are not. This thesis excavates the
roots of inter-ethnic tensions and genocidal oppressions in contemporary
Myanmar by tracing the historical development of Burmese identity based on the
exclusion of ethnic and racial “others.” The subsequent chapters will illustrate
how Burmese identity developed during Burma’s fight for independence from
Britain and became increasingly exclusionary and phobic of South Asians. To
understand what it means to be Burmese, we must understand Myanmar’s
colonial past.
In this thesis, I argue that Burmese national identity is defined by Bamar
ethnolinguistic and Buddhist identities, with this definition originating as a way to
unite an ethnic majority against British colonial rule. Ethnic and religious
nationalism came at the expense of minority groups, especially the Indian
minority population, due to the divide and rule policies of the British Empire. The
British created a volatile environment where nationalism would take on a
racialized tone, aimed at unseating perceived co-colonialist minorities who helped
repress the Bamar Buddhist majority. Bamar nationalists, unable to directly attack
the British, constructed a national identity centered around their ethnicity and
religion to exclude both the British and their co-colonialist allies from a proud
post-colonial Myanmar. This resulted in inter-ethnic violence between

4

Hannah Beech, “Across Myanmar,” The New York Times, October 24, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com.
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Myanmar’s government and ethnic minorities, which has continued since
independence from Britain, in what has been described as “the world’s longest
civil war.”5 According to political scientist Robert H. Taylor, while “ceasefire
agreements with ethnically-designed groups provided an opportunity to restate the
argument as to what it means to be a Myanmar citizen…the country’s multiethnic
identity was championed [by the state]…no clear definition of Myanmar-ness was
provided.”6 Rather than clearly defining Burmese national identity, defining who
constituted an out-group became how “Myanmar-ness” would be expressed both
in contemporary and colonial Myanmar. Despite the Myanmar government
characterizing national identity as being loyal to the state “irrespective of
ethnicity or religion,” the Rohingya Genocide illustrates that persecution exists in
Myanmar on the grounds of religious and ethnic identities. With this project, I
will explore how the Myanmar state emerged from colonial-era racial and
religious identities; thus, its national character is synonymous with ethnicity as
well as religion and cannot be defined without either.
History is what makes us human, we are the only species to record our
experiences, and thus when agents purposely distort history it is often to cover up
a truth. Amidst ceasefire agreements in 1988, the Myanmar government went
about “distorting the variety and diversity of Myanmar’s historical relations.”
Myanmar’s history has now become “the history of Myanmar kings and a heroic
struggle against British colonialism,” which is just as much of a distortion as the

5

David Miliband, “David Miliband: How to Bring Peace to the World’s Longest Civil War,”
Time, December 12, 2016, https://time.com/4597920/myanmar-peace/.
6
Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2009), 473.

8

previous British narrative of Myanmar’s “kings oppressing the indigenous
peoples.”7 In both cases, the historical narrative is dichotomous, stories of
interethnic conflict are swept away in favor of promoting a national identity based
on a constructed idea of unity. While Myanmar’s government certainly deserves
the right to frame their people’s struggle against the British as one of exceptional
courage, the presence of co-colonialists, disunity in the nationalist movement, and
nuanced conversations, in general, are suppressed in favor of the idea of a united
Burmese people without a clear definition of what that identity entails. Chapter
One explores this larger historiographical debate, of the role of pre-colonial
Burmese kingdoms and British colonization in formulating a Burmese nationalist
movement. To understand how Burmese nationalists chose to resist British rule
and create a modern Burmese identity, Chapter One introduces the nuances of
Burmese identity before the British invasion. This provides a control group to
which the evolution of Burmese identity at different stages in the 20th century can
be compared. Through studying pre-colonial notions of Burmese identity, we can
better understand who is defined as “British” in the Myanmar government’s
version of their anti-colonial struggle.
To understand why the term “Bengali” takes the form of a racial slur in
modern Myanmar, we must understand the evolution of what it meant to be a part
of the post-colonial Burmese state. The anti-colonial independence movement that
founded Myanmar was primarily led by the Buddhist Bamar ethnolinguistic
group, whose vision of national identity was affected by whom they had to fight

7

Ibid., 474.
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to gain independence. The most common anti-colonial narrative only gives
agency to the Bamar nationalists and the British, but what about ethnic groups
that had different visions for the future? This thesis will trace the evolution of
Burmese national identity over time through three case studies from Myanmar’s
colonial past, each highlighting a major instance of interethnic conflict and the
role of the British in exacerbating tensions. These case studies help us define key
manifestations of Burmese identity that will help explain what it meant to be
Burmese in post-colonial Myanmar and why the nation continues to experience
large-scale interethnic violence.
The first case study will introduce how Burmese history’s largest anticolonial peasant rebellion used the legacy of pre-colonial Burmese kingship and
Buddhism to assert from that point forward that “to be Burmese is to be
Buddhist.” Burmese peasants used Buddhism and traditional symbols of kingship
from the pre-colonial era to unite the countryside against the British and their cocolonialist allies. We shall see that the importance of Buddhism to the modern
Burmese is a continuation of pre-colonial expressions of Buddhist identity as a
tool of anti-colonial resistance. Burmese national identity was also fortified
through geography during the colonial era and the characterization of the
Rohingya as “Bengali” illustrates that geographic origin continues to define
membership in a national community.
The second case study will show the debate over whether colonial Burma
and India should be separated provided a platform for defining Burma and South
Asia and their respective indigenous peoples as distinct. Geography could now
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transform ethnic differences into racial divisions and provide concrete boundaries
upon which South Asians could be excluded from a Burmese national community.
The conception of South Asians as an “out-group” united Bamar Buddhists as the
stakeholders in an independent Burma and sheds light on why the term “Bengali”
is a pejorative.
Finally, the third case study examines the ultimate expression of Burmese
identity where exclusion transformed into violence and birthed a civic identity of
protecting “Burmese-ness” through action. This case study will show how the
Islamophobia and dehumanizing rhetoric toward South Asians was a deliberate
act by Bamar ethnic-nationalists to unite themselves under a single identity of
being Bamar, Buddhist, and distinctly not from South Asia. The violence
described in the third case study is comparable to anti-Rohingya pogroms and
illustrates the relevance of Myanmar’s colonial history in the modern world.
Through these three case studies, we will see how modern Burmese antiRohingya rhetoric can be traced to the way Burmese identity evolved during the
colonial era.
Myanmar’s government certainly possesses a whitewashed and broad
definition of a Myanmar citizen based on a false history of inter-ethnic unity
against the British. Under this facade of tolerance, attacks on the Rohingya
continue despite the dichotomous narrative of Burmese versus the British.
However, this thesis is not a history of the Rohingya Genocide but rather a story
of how Burmese national identity during the colonial era became increasingly
discriminatory. This path towards exclusivity was not predestined but rather a
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deliberate way to unite the Bamar ethnic majority against the British and cocolonialist ethnic minorities. However, we can understand the origins of antiRohingya sentiment by analyzing the factors which contributed to an exclusionary
Burmese national identity. The Burmese actors who champion exclusivity use
British conceptions of race and ethnicity–but do so of their own accord. Through
this thesis, we will enhance our understanding of why so many Burmese perceive
the Rohingya Genocide as the antithesis of injustice.

12

CHAPTER ONE
Burma, Burman, or Burmese: Tracing the Idea of a Modern Burmese State
The Divisive Debate Over Terminology
I had always known that half of my family hailed from Myanmar. My
father never hesitated to talk about his grueling childhood trips to fetch water
from the village well. When I asked him what his previous nationality was, he
would say “I am Burmese.” Yet something is interesting about the terms “Burma”
and “Burmese,” more than that they are in reference to the former name of the
nation. The choice of terminology in reference to national identity can embody
political affiliation and be an inextricable identifier of a person’s generational
upbringing. In 1989 the new military government of the “Union of Burma”
changed the name of the nation to the “Union of Myanmar.”8 My father and his
side of the family immigrated to the United States in 1988, carrying terminology
from a previous regime. When describing the research that has gone into this
thesis project, I am often asked “isn’t Myanmar the better term to describe the
country?” The answer to this question cannot be given in the form of a “yes or
no,” but I will attempt to provide nuance to this ongoing discussion.
Historians Michael Aung-Thwin and Maitrii Aung-Thwin in their book, A
History of Myanmar Since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations,
provide the necessary historical context to understand this debate over
terminology and provide a nuanced model for terminology which I will use as a

8

Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 171, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107051034.
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guide in this thesis. Both historians recognize that “Myanmar” comes from the
Burmese language word Myanma which is an adjective that, when used with the
word Pyay, becomes the name of the country.9 But what about the name
“Burma?” Burma is first and foremost an English language term imposed by the
British. Michael and Maitrii Aung-Thwin believe that the word “Burma” was
phonetically derived from the indigenous Burmese language word Bama, the
“colloquial equivalent of Myanma.”10 Burmese is the language of the Bamar (also
called Burman) ethnolinguistic majority who have dominated the political sphere
in Myanmar both prior to and after British rule. In addition to “Burma” being a
British imposed term, it fell out of favor with the Bamar military government who
favored the term “Myanmar.” The name changed in 1989 and fell in line with
movements to replace colonial names––symbols of foreign domination––with
indigenous ones; the renaming of “Ceylon” to “Sri Lanka” represents another
such example. It is also important to consider that “Burma” and Myanmar” both
represent the Burmese nation-state which was rationalized during colonial rule.
Prior to British colonization, kingdoms bearing dynastic names such as Pagan and
Kombaung (to reference the first and last Burmese kingdoms), governed the land
of Myanmar, as opposed to nation-states. Michael and Maitrii Aung-Thwin
suggest that “the word ‘Burma’ has no legal standing internationally, is clearly
exogenous, and only perpetuates rather than resolves current tensions.”11 A

9

Michael Aung-Thwin and Maitrii Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar: Since Ancient Times ;
Traditions and Transformations (London: Reaktion Books, 2013), 7,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/colby/detail.action?docID=1127617.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 8.
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History of Myanmar Since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations is
unique in the field of Myanmar studies because it uses the “internationally
recognized legal term ‘Myanmar’ for the country, ‘Burmese’ for the national
group and language, and ‘Burma’ when the context dictates, usually for
references made during the colonial period.”12 Such nuance in the terminology
used by the Aung-Thwins exemplifies the appropriate explanations historians
should use when choosing their method of describing the ethnolinguistic and
political history of former colonies.
The issue of terminology is further complicated by the spoken and written
language, Burmese, from which the terms Myanma and Bama come. While
Burmese is the language used by most of the modern-day people living in
Myanmar, it is only one of many languages spoken within the country’s
internationally recognized borders. Therefore, we must ask if it is fair to define
the civic nationality of ethnic minorities in Myanmar using imposed linguistic
terms from an ethnic majority whose members run the Myanmar government and
launch “counter-insurgency” operations against these ethnic minorities. Journalist
Martin Smith compares the effects of the rapid spread of Burmese in Myanmar to
English becoming the dominant language in the British Isles. Smith uses the
example of English language dominance in the British Isles amidst continuing
Scots, Irish, and Welsh nationalisms to suggest that the Burmese language is part
of a longstanding Bamar nationalist effort to forcibly assimilate Myanmar’s ethnic
minorities. Smith writes the following:
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With the rapid spread of Burmese over the last century, language is
another confusing denominator for ethnic identity. Certainly, in Great
Britain, where Gaelic and Welsh are little spoken today, the widespread
use of English has done little to dampen nationalist enthusiasms amongst
the Scots, Irish, and Welsh. Nor do the majority Burmans, who are still
generally agreed to make up an estimated two-thirds of the population,
necessarily form one distinct or homogenous political bloc.13
Despite the minimal effects of the Burmese language on uniting the largely
monolingual Bamar population, Smith introduces the idea that the Burmese
language threatens the cultural longevity of Myanmar’s ethnolinguistic minorities
in a similar case to the effect of English within the British Isles. While nationalist
minority movements will still exist, Smith portrays Burmese as a tool for forced
assimilation. Therefore, it is important to recognize that generalizing the people
living in Myanmar as “Burmese” removes the agency of indigenous groups such
as the Karen People, who have nationalist elements that continue to fight for an
independent state. When observers talk about history and events in Myanmar, it is
best practice to reference each group by name rather than using the term
“Burmese.” Therefore, in my analysis, I will use the term “Burmese” to reference
those who conceptualize themselves as members of the state in Burma or
Myanmar.
There is no right answer to the debate over whether the term “Myanmar”
or “Burma” should be used to define the nation. Simply put, a person’s feelings
towards the Myanmar government are often displayed by which name they use.
However, using the Aung-Thwins’ terminology model is an effective way to
describe the nation and its respective ethnic groups without offending. In this

13

Smith, Martin, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London, New York: Zed Books
Ltd, 1999), 31.
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thesis, I use “Myanmar” to refer to the nation post-1989, “Burma” for pre-1989
events, and “Burmese” to describe language and the nationality while specifying
regional ethnolinguistic groups by their English language names. Through this
approach, modeled after A History of Myanmar Since Ancient Times: Traditions
and Transformations, I aim to avoid removing agency from groups within
colonial Burma and modern Myanmar.

Buddhism, Sangha, and the State
Theravada Buddhism has been the undisputed dominant religion in
modern Myanmar, colonial Burma, and pre-colonial Burma. While the Christian
Sgaw Karen and Muslim Rohingya are notable exceptions to total Buddhist
hegemony, the persecution of these minority groups illustrates the significance of
Buddhism in Myanmar’s history. Understanding the role of Buddhism in Burmese
society is one way to clarify the conceptions of Burmese statehood and the impact
of interethnic conflict. In a 1922 issue of the Burma Observer, the Bamar
nationalist, Hting Aung wrote, “the Burmese people cannot think of nationality
apart from the religion that they hold, for it is Buddhism which has welded the
Burmese together and the idea of nationhood owes its inception to Buddhism.”14
Published during the colonial era, Hting Aung’s writing demonstrates that
conceptions of Burmese nationhood and therefore, conceptions of ethnicity and
anti-colonialism are inextricably linked to Buddhism. However, the role of
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Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965), 83.
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Buddhism and its path towards politicization developed gradually over the precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras of Burmese history.
Historians have formed a consensus that Buddhism influenced the
conception and operations of the pre-colonial Burmese state. In his seminal work
A History of Modern Burma, John F. Cady argues that Buddhism and its
associated ecclesiastic organization, the Sangha (sacred order of monks),
“touched virtually all elements of the population” and was the “most important
nonpolitical segment of the society in old Burma.”15 The significance of the
Sangha was due to their role in helping “the laity to acquire merit (kutho) by
contributing to [monks’] daily needs as they made their daily rounds.”16 With the
value of merit in Buddhism, the importance of the monks to the happiness of the
populace is agreed upon. Cady’s description of the Sangha as nonpolitical
contradicts his earlier statement that “[t]o preserve the treasure of Buddhism
constituted traditionally the very raison d’etre of the Burman state.”17 While not
officially a branch of the last Burmese dynasty, the Kombaung (1752-1885), the
Sangha and the state relied on each other for maintaining political stability. The
creation of the position of thathanabaing (head of the Sangha in pre-colonial
Burma selected by the king) formed the foundation of a Burmese state politically
linked to Buddhism and the Sangha.18
Manuel Sarkisyanz’s work Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese
Revolution argues that the structure of the pre-colonial Burmese state supported
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John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1958), 49.
Ibid., 51.
17
Ibid., 50.
18
Ibid., 53.
16
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the Buddhist faith through policies that provided laypeople with the resources to
observe religious traditions. Theravada Buddhists believed that “deliverance
could only be achieved through individual contemplation and meditation which
alone was to permit man to save himself.”19 This meant that pious agriculturalists
needed to spend valuable time away from the rice fields to meditate; Sarkisyanz
suggests that Burmese monarchies implemented policies that took the form of
what we would call a “welfare state.” He writes, “[t]hus the royal ideal was a
welfare state, at least to the extent of guaranteeing the economic basis of leisure
necessary for meditation.”20 Therefore, for its citizens to achieve salvation, the
government needed to maintain favorable social and economic conditions so that
the peasantry had time for meditation. Meditation practices in the pre-colonial era
for the laymen typically consisted of making food offerings to monks as they
made their alms rounds.21 The Burmese state apparatus safeguarding peasants’
ability to practice Buddhism consisted of royal food distributions and the
cancelling of peasant debt, establishing a symbiotic relationship between the
peasantry, the state, and the Sangha.22 The state worked to ensure the livelihood
of its subjects through social welfare, and in return the citizens meditated and
used their surplus money to provide alms to the Sangha. In this situation, all three
respective groups benefit from the functioning of the other, disruptions to any one
element and the system will struggle to function as the livelihood and salvation of
19

Manuel Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. (Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 2013), 56,
https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5586011.
20
Ibid.
21
Harvard Divinity School, “Buddhism in Myanmar,” Religion and Public Life, Harvard Divinity
School, accessed March 14, 2022, https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/buddhism-myanmar.
22
Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution., 54–55.
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the population would be at stake. The interdependence of these groups would
eventually spell the downfall of the entire system in the wake of the total British
conquest of Burma in 1885 and establishing a secular state with no intention of
supporting the Buddhist religion.23 British rule was the antithesis of a welfare
state due to the introduction of Burma to world capitalism through the
development of a rice export economy in Lower Burma. With no royal aid, the
peasantry lost the ability to provide alms to the Sangha who in turn lost both their
ability to influence the state and pray for the salvation of Buddhists in Burma.
The extent to which Buddhism, as well as the influence of royal authority,
played a role in pre-colonial Burma varied the distance one traveled from the
capital. James C. Scott, in The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History
of Upland Southeast Asia, suggests that the plurality of administrative systems
between the state core and its border territories can be best described using the
Sanskritic term mandala (“circle of kings”).24 In the mandala polity, “the
influence of the ruler, often claiming divine lineages, emanates from a court
center, almost always located on a rice plain.”25 We have seen that Buddhism and
the monarchy in pre-colonial Burma were symbiotic; therefore, Burma’s ethnic
minorities living on the outskirts of the mandala often retained animist beliefs or
converted to Christianity during the colonial era because they were not under the
direct rule of the Buddhist monarchy. Scott’s work provides a useful context for
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Jun Young Jang, “Buddhist Nationalism and Its Limitations in Colonial Myanmar: The Crossing
of Tradition and Modernity,” International Area Review 13, no. 2 (June 2010): 168,
https://doi.org/10.1177/223386591001300209.
24
James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast
Asia, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven London: Yale University Press, 2009), 58.
25
Ibid.
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understanding how the colonial state presence, which permeated Burma through
its large military presence and the recruitment of indigenous minorities as police,
dramatically extended the radius of state authority in Burma. To the Bamar living
near the state core who relied on the Buddhist “welfare state,” the colonial state
was detrimental to them achieving salvation. In contrast, for the non-Buddhists
such as the many Indian immigrants, Karen, and Rohingya peoples, the colonial
state brought a sense of relief as Buddhism and state authority no longer worked
together to assimilate these groups.
The state-sponsorship of Buddhism weakened the pre-colonial Burmese
government in times of conflict. Jordan Carlyle Winfield draws attention to how a
mutually beneficial relationship between the state, Sangha, and people was upheld
only if each group fulfilled its obligations. Winfield argues the following:
Nonetheless divine sanction can also be a two-edged sword. While
religion can strengthen the authority of a kind and his dynasty, it also
places certain obligations upon both him and his heirs, for as long as the
church, and state, and the relationship between them, endure. Obedience to
authority becomes dependent on how closely that authority meets these
obligations.26
The introduction of obligations stabilized the Burmese state in peacetime but
ultimately made its structure rigid and unable to adapt to the modern world. The
people became dependent on their king for the welfare to achieve salvation thus
when the British deposed the last Burmese monarch, Thibaw, on 28th November
1885, “‘the street crowd wept…for, whatever he may have been, he was, after all,
their king.’”27 From the perspective that the king represented the welfare state, the
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peasants’ weeping can be interpreted as weeping for the idea of the king as a
guide to their religious salvation. With the Kombaung Dynasty disintegrated, the
Burmese peasants now perceived the path to salvation as blocked. However, this
raises the question of why the Burmese Buddhists attached the idea of obtaining
salvation to the monarchy? The answer lies in the Buddhist backgrounds of
Buddhist kingship.
The Burmese king was more than a political leader, he represented an
almost divine being who embodied the values of the Buddhist faith. The
reverence towards the king is expressed by Grattan Geary, a British journalist
working colonial-Burma, who writes “that the Burmese monarch; that the king in
Mandalay, whether Theebaw or another, is the god of their idolatry.”28 The divine
conception of the Buddhist king presented the risk of instability in the event of a
regime change executed by the British. A non-Buddhist could not bring about
stability due to the divine nature of kingship rooted in Buddhist beliefs. The king
and his government combined both the material world and the cosmological.
Winfield suggests that this “parallelism between the greater universe and the
world of men” meant that the British disruption to the dynastic system would
permanently damage the relationship between the people and the state as any nonBuddhist leader would not have the cosmological right to rule.29 Because “the
kingdom, the capital, the court and even the coronation ritual [was] to mirror
aspects of the Buddhist universe,” the Burmese consequently perceived the
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Christian British administration as sacrilegious and an insult to the Buddhist
state.30 Winfield builds on Gratton’s analysis that the position of king in precolonial Burma was perceived as divine which would have lasting implications of
political instability when the system was challenged.
Geary expands on the importance of Buddhist kingship and its associated
structures, suggesting that the position of king, due to its significance in the
Buddhist “welfare state,” was more important to the people than the inhabitant of
the throne. In his travels, Geary interviewed the thathanabaing from the reign of
King Thibaw and wrote “whoever the prince may be, if he protected the religion
and gave comfort and security to the people, he would be a good ruler.”31 Geary
builds on the significance of the reciprocity between the state and the people
inherent to the Buddhist “welfare state,” where kingship meant a reduction of
strains on the population through state donations and construction of temples. It
was the reduction of strains on the population, associated with the Buddhist
welfare state, that attracted reverence towards the crown as opposed to the idea of
an absolute ruler or the character of the king himself. Geary suggests that if the
peasantry and the Sangha were appeased, the existence of the monarchy could be
looked upon with indifference. Therefore, so long as the British did not try and
appoint a new king and maintained the Buddhist “welfare-state,” there would be
relative peace. However, the British invasions of Burma disrupted more than any
appeasement of the peasantry could ameliorate.
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As I have demonstrated, the pre-colonial Burmese state was upheld by
interdependency between the Sangha, state, and people. However, this narrative
has illustrated that while most of the population was Buddhist, the development of
a Burmese national identity was still in its infancy. At this point, Buddhism was
tied to the state, the people adhered to the religion for salvation but the bottom-up
conception of being a member of a national “in-group” was still limited to being
Buddhist. The construction of national “in-groups” and “out-groups” would only
occur with the destruction of the Kombaung Dynasty by the British. Stephen L.
Keck supports the notion that the “end of traditional Burma” came with the end of
the Kombaung Dynasty during the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885. Keck
argues that “British rule over all of Burma required the termination of the
Kombaung Dynasty.”32 With the understanding that the relative stability of the
precolonial welfare state was supported by collaboration between the Sangha and
monarchy, Keck’s argument suggests that British rule over Burma could not
function alongside the welfare state system. If the Sangha and the people were
dependent on the monarchy, then British rule would foreshadow the destruction of
Buddhist institutions and the welfare of the peasantry. The definition of “new
century Burma” by Keck as “the combination of British rule, modernization and
commercial interests in the Indian Ocean” suggests that Buddhism ceased to be
the state religion under colonial rule.33 Due to how Buddhism had been an
inherent part of the pre-colonial government, secular rule raised the question of
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whether Burmese civic identity could still manifest itself as association with the
colonial state. As Buddhism was equated to welfare in the eyes of the peasantry,
the sidelining of Buddhism and the Sangha established a clear set of differences
the population could use to categorize people. The new regime was non-Buddhist
and the Bamar peasantry was Buddhist. This establishment of a new “in-group”
and an “out-group” based on religion would thereby form the basis of a national
identity for the Buddhist Burmese.
In his book Religion and Politics in Burma, Eugene Smith contrasts
Keck’s argument that Burmese nationalism emerged from the British destruction
of the Kombaung Monarchy and the Buddhist welfare state. Smith argues that
Burmese nationalism took two modes, “traditional” and “modern” with the latter
developing after the former.34 He defines “traditional” nationalism as “political
unification” and a “separateness from other lands” while “modern nationalism”
required the concept “of the nation as the object of ultimate political loyalty.”35
The contemporary terms “ethnic” and “civic” nationalism respectively reflect
Smith’s characterization of Burmese nationalism as taking the forms of
“traditional” or “modern.” Rather than Burmese nationalism being traced to the
British destruction of traditional society in Burma, Smith suggests that
“Buddhism became a powerful component of traditional Burmese nationalism” as
“[t]he Burmese language was strongly influenced by Pali, the language of the
Buddhist scriptures, and many of the best writers in Burmese were monks.”36 The
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notion that “part of the nationalist response to [British] rule must be understood in
terms of traditional nationalism” gives merit to analyzing modern Burmese
nationalism through the impact of British colonialism on the Buddhist faith.37 To
be Burmese meant being a Buddhist and not British; the idea that white people
could not be Buddhists due to a lack of “enlightenment” and not living on Mount
Meru furthered the ties between Burmese identity, nationalism, and the Buddhist
faith.38 In contrast to the more prevalent narrative that nationalism emerged
because of indigenous persons borrowing ideas from Europe, traditional
nationalism suggests that European invasion amplified, but did not create, the
modern conception of being Burmese.
Alecia Turner presents a twofold argument regarding Burmese
nationalism, while subscribing to the narrative that the earliest forms of Burmese
resistance were through a Buddhist lens, Turner acknowledges that Burmese
nationalism was “inherently multiple” from the beginning. In her paper
“Narratives of Nation, Questions of Community: Examining Burmese Sources
without the Lens of Nation,” Turner argues that there emerged “a movement to
preserve Buddhism and the Buddha’s [teachings] under changing cultural
conditions in the three decades leading up to the 1920s. In the 1910s, some in
these movements began to articulate their ideas in terms of nation and by 1921,
the nationalist movement, by all accounts, had come into its own.”39 A Burmese
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civic identity, predicated on the idea that the citizenry had a duty to defend
Buddhism, developed in the 1920s through a revitalization of the association of
Buddhism with Bamar ethnic identity. This argument illustrates the validity of
using Buddhism as a lens to understand the multiple visions of a Burmese nation
and who “belonged” in this nation. With the first nationalist movements taking
root from a Buddhist revival in opposition to Western imperialism, the rhetoric of
modern nationhood was linked with Buddhism and thereby Buddhists as well.
Turner’s presentation of how “Burmese identity was never singular or completely
unified… [d]iverse and hybrid modes of Burmese identity thrived even in the
heart of the anti-colonial nationalist movement, and it was this multiplicity that
made the response to colonialism possible,” alerts scholars to the danger of
starting with one characterization of Burmese nationalism.40 Turner instead uses
an approach where she offers “a micro-history of a single moment in the rise of
the anti-colonial nationalist movement,” to better “focus in closely and be more
attuned to the diversity of voices apparent.”41 The importance given to the
discourse amongst the colonized through this “microscopic” approach promises a
return of agency to the indigenous people of Burma considering the prevalence of
Eurocentric narratives. Therefore, I am using a similar “microscopic” approach in
my narrative of Burmese nationalism through the three case studies presented in
the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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Race and Nationalism in Furnivall’s Plural Society
The philosophy behind most modern scholarly work on Burma’s
interethnic history is based on John S. Furnivall’s notion that colonial Burma was
a “plural society.” In Furnivall’s words, Burmese society was
a medley of various peoples–European, Chinese, Indian and Native. It is in
the strictest sense a medley, a mixture, for they mix but do not combine.
Each group holds its own ideas and ways of life. As individuals they meet
together; but only in the marketplace, in buying and selling. Under native
rule the social organization had a plural character; under Western rule it
has been transformed into what may be termed a plural society, with
different sections of the community living side by side but separately
within the same political unit.42
Scholars of Burma such as Michael Adas and John Cady subscribe to Furnivall’s
notion of a “plural society,” because colonial Burma was ethnically diverse yet
Burmese identity had a different meaning to each respective ethnic group. The
notion of a plural society provides a broad lens by which to provide background
for interethnic conflict. Examining the conflict between the Bamar and Indian
immigrants using the framework that ethnic groups interacted economically while
maintaining separate identities helps contextualize early Burmese nationalist
rhetoric. Michael Adas, in The Burma Delta, supports this notion that “[d]ivisions
and the potential for conflict are far stronger than the forces which serve to
integrate the various segments.”43 Fundamental differences in language, culture,
and religion between the Bamar, Indian (often laborers, administrators, and
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moneylenders from the Indian subcontinent), and Karen peoples made the idea of
a unified state unpopular.44 The Bamar majority would not submit to rule by
minorities and the ethnic minorities possessed enough influence that their
submission to the Bamar was unacceptable. A plural society does not encourage
cooperation between different groups and under the British policy of divide and
rule, Furnivall is correct in expressing that Burmese society changed from having
a “plural character” to becoming a “plural society.” However, it is important to
consider how and when the idea of a singular Burma emerged in the context of
pluralism. I will trace the idea of a Burmese nation-state, through the lens of the
plural society, for the remainder of this chapter.
Buddhism and Burmese society have been intertwined for centuries with
Buddhism forming a pillar of Bamar ethnic identity. However, Buddhism alone
could not form the identity of the post-colonial Bamar-dominated state because
many ethnic groups including the Shan, Karen, Mon, and Chinese are majority
Buddhists within their broader ethnolinguistic identities. The creation of a
western-style Bamar-dominated Burmese state only began in the 1900s through
the construct of race. Michael Adas argues that a limited number of resources in
the plural society led to competition between ethnic groups, with the expansion by
any one group destabilizing the society. He writes, “when one of the groups begin
to covet and compete for a larger share or control of niches held by others, the

44

“Indian” in this period was in reference to people originating from the Indian Subcontinent.
Most Indian immigrants to Burma came from the Bengal and Madras presidencies of the British
Indian Empire. Particularly relevant in this thesis is the caste of moneylenders from southern
India, the Chettiars (also spelled Chettyars).

29

whole plural society is threatened.”45 While Adas suggests that economic
competition led to antagonism between ethnic groups, this interethnic competition
solidified ethnic identity and promoted rejection of plurality. Economic strife was
thereby a catalyst for the construction of nationalist movements along ethnic lines.
Adas argues that the Wunthanu Athins (“own race” organizations) “provided the
major bridge between urban-based nationalist leaders and the rural masses.”46
Here we see ethnic nationalism taking hold and becoming a tool to organize
people in the fight for independence. Since the Bamar founded and dominated the
Wunthanu Athins, we see that the Burmese state found its roots in organizations
that advocated for racial divisions. However, we must understand that the
characterization of ethnic groups of Burma as separate “races” was a British
construction. The subheading of the book Burma Through the Centuries, from
1909, describes the work as “being a short account of the leading races of Burma,
of their origin, and of their struggles for supremacy.”47 We see that the British
engineered and espoused the rhetoric that the ethnic groups of Burma were
distinct, always in competition with one another, and could never be united. This
philosophy sewed disunity amongst the indigenous population making colonial
“divide and rule” all the easier. Therefore, the intensification of ethnic division
laid the foundation for the Bamar ethnonationalist idea that post-colonial Burmese
national identity would be dominated by the identity of their majority
ethnolinguistic group.
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Donald Eugene Smith builds on Adas’ argument that the development of
Burmese nationalism and the conception of a Burmese state emerged from ethnic
differences amplified by the British. Smith writes the following:
[c]ommunal conflict tended to define Burmese nationalism more clearly in
that it emphasized the positive content of national identity. Nationalism
was not simply anti-British sentiment and a movement for freedom from
foreign rule. Many Indians in Burma were equally anti-British. Traditional
Burmese nationalism was based, among other things, on a common race,
language, and religion. In terms of these significant characteristics which
identify and distinguish peoples, the Indians were as different from the
Burmese as the British were, ‘Burma for the Burmans,’ a typical
nationalist slogan, struck at both the British and the Indians.48
Smith’s argument illustrates how the Bamar nationalist movement, which
constructed the modern Burmese state, was itself constructed through division.
The importance of race in determining “who belongs” in Burma is displayed by
how the notion of being Burmese meant not being British or Indian. Smith details
how identifying and distinguishing between different peoples within the plural
society based on race, language, and religion was an important step in the
formation of a Burmese state. The Bamar nationalists’ anti-Indian slogans such as
“Burma for the Burmans” suggest that their conception of Burmese national
identity never intended to include those who were not Bamar and Buddhist.49
While Indians suffered under British rule, the Bamar framing of Indians as an
enemy due to differences in race, religion, and language conveys the importance
of these British methods of categorization in imagining national “out-groups” and
“in-groups.” The Burmese nation emerged from the ethnonationalist idea of a
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state expunged of the racial diversity of a plural society that would exclude any
non-Bamar and be distinctly homogenous.
The visions for the ethnic and religious composition of the Burmese state
emerged from Bamar ethnonationalism and exploitations of the racial divisions
found in a plural society; however, Albert D. Moscotti says that Bamar
nationalists derived the concept of Bamar national sovereignty and race from
European philosophies. Moscotti argues that Bamar “[national] awareness,
coupled with a distrust of foreigners, did not become a well-articulated nationalist
movement until it came in contact with Western political ideologies and
institutions.”50 Despite Moscotti’s Eurocentric point of view, his argument has
merits as in pre-colonial Burma, “manpower concerns favored easy assimilation
and rapid mobility and, in turn, made for very fluid ethnic boundaries.”51 The
labor paradigm in the pre-colonial mandala polity did not favor strict definitions
of ethnic identity; thus, an exclusionary national identity would have been
detrimental to the survival of the pre-colonial kingdoms. However, in the colonial
capitalist state, the population of Burma grew with the help of immigrant labor;
therefore, the labor shortage which had made Burmese identity fluid was replaced
by European ideas of racial categorization and the formation of a plural society. It
was the imported ideas of strict racial categorization which provided an
environment for the Bamar ethnonationalists to develop exclusionary definitions
of Burmese identity. Moscotti suggests that a “[t]he adaptation of western
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political ideologies and institutions to the aspirations and demands of a
homogenous society produce the matrix from which the Burmese nationalist
movement developed.”52 As we have seen, intense xenophobia exhibited by the
Bamar provided a vision for the composition of a future state, and ideas of
national self-determination after World War One catalyzed a push for selfgovernment. These ideas were not simply adapted from European ones, rather
European imperialism created a new environment which fostered exclusivity as a
part of a national community. The combination of ethnic pride and “Western
political ideologies and institutions” laid the foundation for the Bamar
ethnonationalists to act upon their visions of a homogenous Burmese state in
direct opposition to a plural society.
Joseph Silverstein, in his book Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of
National Unity, supports Moscotti’s argument that Western political ideology and
Bamar ethnonationalism pushed the vision of a Bamar-ruled Burmese state into
fruition. Silverstein cites how the first Burmese nationalist organization, the
Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), “modeled after the Young Men’s
Christian Association, was founded to look after the religious, educational, and
social needs of the people.”53 Furthermore, the wave of Burmese nationalism
between 1930-1931 saw the growth of the Dobama Asiayone or “We Burman
Society.” This nationalist group consisted of younger members from the educated
Bamar political elite who grew disillusioned with older nationalists that were less
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inclined to directly challenge the British. Members of the Dobama Asiayone
called themselves Thakin, which translates to “master,” and was a term the
Burmese used to address British officials.54 The Thakins embodied a radical shift
in Burmese nationalism that celebrated the military history of Bamar kingdoms
and “drew its ideas from Marxism, the Sein Fein movement of Ireland, and the
fascist movements of Italy and Germany” with the goal of independence.55 The
Dobama Asiayone became the most influential nationalist movement whose ranks
included future Burmese politicians U Nu, Aung San, and Ne Win. Silverstein
suggests that Western ideology provided the organizational framework for Bamar
ethnonationalism to develop into a political movement that could provide a
nominally stable administration. Silverstein does add some nuance to Moscotti’s
argument, pointing out that “between 1917 and 1922, the Burmans attempted to
organize an all-embracing nationalist movement. The General Council of
Burmese Associations (GCBA), which succeeded the Y.M.B.A., attempted, by
changing its name and activity, to represent all the peoples in Burma.”56 The
Burmese nationalist movement was not monolithic as the formation of the GCBA
illustrated that there was dissent within the YMBA regarding the goals of the
nationalist movement. While the YMBA’s “raison d’etre” was to preserve
Buddhism, the GCBA’s campaigning to a broader religious and ethnic audience
suggests a shift towards civic identity in the effort to create a Burmese nationstate. This encourages looking at anti-colonial resistance from a horizontal
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approach because the GCBA illustrates that not all nationalist movements
subscribed to the same visions. However, the GCBA’s mission to broaden their
constituency “did not attract minorities who gave their support to the British, and
it could not contain the politically articulate Burmans who were divided on goals
and tactics.”57 We see from Silverstein’s work that the Bamar nationalist
movement in the early 1920s was full of competing ideas for how best to develop
and articulate a Burmese identity. The dissent between the YMBA and GCBA
suggests that there was even a divide within established nationalist organizations.
However, the rise of the Dobama Asiayone in the aftermath of the Saya San
peasant uprising of 1930 replaced nuance in the Bamar nationalist conversations
in favor of a monolithic Bamar ethnonationalist movement.
To disseminate and convince the Bamar majority of their “superiority” and
right to independence, Bamar nationalists used British biological racism to
dehumanize and create national out-groups. According to Chie Ikeya, in her book
Refiguring Women Colonialism and Modernity in Burma, “the term Kala, as it
was disseminated in the Burmese media in the 1920s and 1930s, pigeonholed
immigrants from the Indian-subcontinent as uneducated, lower-class (or lowercaste) men and women, typically of skin color darker than that of Burmese
people, when in fact many of those categorized as ‘Indian’ in Burma were
relatively prosperous.”58 The creation of a distinct label for all Indians
dehumanizes and creates the perception of an “enemy.” The Bamar now

57

Ibid.
Chie Ikeya, Refiguring Women, Colonialism, and Modernity in Burma, Southeast Asia--Politics,
Meaning, and Memory (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 138.
58

35

possessed a tool to easily malign and threaten Indians using the press and in
everyday conversation, promoting of the idea of Bamar racial “superiority” and
the conversion from a plural to a homogenous society. Ikeya cites a description
from the 1897 British travel book Picturesque Burma, Past and Present by Alice
M. R. Hart that “‘Indian Chetties dress, eat, and live as if they had a very meagre
income, and have the appearance of mere savages,’” to argue that the British
provided the Bamar with the tools necessary to begin discriminating and
“culturally encoding” hatred against non-Bamar, especially Indians, on an
extreme scale.59 Ikeya illustrates that the leading vision for a Burmese state was
one built by exclusion using the principles of cultural racism and British
biological racism.60 Ironically, the British used biological racism as the basis for
their policies of oppression against the Bamar whom they deemed “unready” for
self-governance.
Despite British reservations for granting Burma self-governance, the
process of separating the Province of Burma from the British Indian Empire
assisted Bamar nationalists in delineating the borders of a Burmese state.
Historian Nalini Chakravarti’s, The Indian Minority in Burma, suggests that the
debate over, and actions towards, separating Burma from British India helped
Burmese nationalists define the ethnic composition and borders of an independent
Burma. Chakravarti writes “by 1922, anti-Indian feelings had become widespread.
The oft-repeated policy of the Government of Burma to prepare the country for
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ultimate separation from India had taken firm roots in Burma politics and
‘separation’ and ‘self-government’ had become synonymous for a large section of
Burma politicians.”61 The reasons Burmese politicians wanted separation from
India are multifaceted; however, Chakravarti illustrates that anti-Indian sentiment,
caused by a general association between Indians and the hardships under British
rule, encouraged nationalists to begin conceptualizing where a Burmese state
would extend geographically.62 The Government of India’s admittance that
“Burma was ‘racially and geographically a distinct country from India,’” in
response to Member for Burma in the Indian Council of State U Po Bye’s call for
a committee to investigate the separation of Burma from British India, highlights
how the idea of an ethnically distinct and independent Burma emerged from the
debate over dyarchy. Furthermore, Chakravarti’s work supports Moscotti,
Silverstein, and Ikeya’s arguments that Burmese nationalists used European
political structures and conceptions of race to further their agendas. Burmese
nationalists showed no reservations in using the Indian Government’s word that
Burma was “racially and geographically distinct” to craft their vision for a
Burmese state after the dyarchy constitution was introduced in 1923.
The Bamar nationalists’ rhetoric of Bamar and Buddhist superiority came
at the expense of all non-Bamar; however, the Indian minority in colonial Burma
were subject to particularly vile dehumanization. Former Burmese President
Maung Maung, in his book From Sangha to Laity: Nationalists Movements of
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Burma 1920-1940, supports Western authors’ claims that Bamar nationalism and
visions for the future were distinctly anti-Indian. Maung describes an anti-Indian
riot, occurring in 1938 and partly a result of growing Bamar anti-Indian beliefs,
perpetrated by members of the Dobama Asiayone (“we Burmans” movement) as
taking the following form:
There they had raised the Peacock flag and made speeches of
commemoration for the unknown heroes of the coolie riots who had
defended Burmese people and the national honor. At the rally they shouted
the awe inspiring ‘battle cry’ of the coolie riots ‘Dobama!’ [our nation]
repeatedly. During the coolie riots, young Burmans who had beaten up
Indians they found attacking Burmans usually shouted out ‘Dobama!’ as a
rallying cry, a sign of encouragement of triumph. In the dark or in a melee
this was the only way of maintaining contact or of getting united action
among themselves.63
The violence perpetrated by the Bamar, “justified” as a defense of national honor,
suggests that by the late 1930s the conception of the nation of Burma was almost
completely developed with this conception being centered around having a
homogenous state with no room for Indians and other minorities. A peacock flag,
the symbol of the Kombaung Dynasty, rising over the crowd reflects the rioters’
reverence towards the power of Bamar under the Kombaung Dynasty and the
importance of their history in crafting the Burmese nation. The combination of the
peacock flag and the shouting of Dobama, meaning “our nation,” by these Bamar
nationalist rioters suggests that they associated their imagined Burmese nation as
unified by Bamar history and ethnic identity. Maung Maung argues that “[f]rom
that time onwards, “Dobama” became a national cry and the symbol of the spirit
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of the Burman.”64 Such a cry appearing as a tool for emboldening the Bamar
rioters not only illustrates that the Dobama Asiayone were attempting to build a
“Burma for the Burmans” but also illustrates that the builders of post-colonial
Burma would be willing to use violence to further their racist ideology. This
foreshadows the violence against minority groups that was to come when the
Bamar, oppressed heavily by the British, were in control of an independent
Burma. Maung Maung illustrates that the “spirit of the Burman” and the acts
perpetrated to establish a Bamar Burma would become increasingly xenophobic
and anti-pluralistic.
Kei Nemoto argues that anti-Indian narratives showed that Burmese
nationalists such as the Dobama Asiayone, expressed their beliefs “by describing
what they were not rather than what they were, and by attacking their imagined
enemies, the thudo-bama (“their Burma”) rather than attempting a clear definition
of dobama.”65 Nemoto reaffirms the argument presented throughout this chapter,
that the nationalists framed their visions of “our Burma” through defining what
they believed was not Burmese rather than defining explicitly what was Burmese.
The idea of thudo-bama (“their Burma”) representing an “invisible enemy,”
allowed the Dobama Asiayone to build up their base by stoking the Bamar fear of
“losing” their nation to ethnic minorities.
The Bamar nationalist movement’s perceived ability to control their own
armed forces after the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942 provided the
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movement with the political unity to implement its visions of national identity.
Political scientist Mary P. Callahan presents legal Bamar militarization, in the
form of militias and the state Burma Independence Army (BIA) during the early
period of Japanese rule, as how “indigenous Burmans emerged as local state
builders in central Burma.”66 The bureaucratic vacuum left from the British retreat
provided an opportunity for the Bamar to take over old administrative units and
develop new ones in their vision.67 Callahan argues that the creation of the first
national army in Burma, the BIA, who “wore uniforms that represented do-Bama
rather than a foreign power or empire” and their duty “to defend national
sovereignty” gave the lower-class Bamar the agency to feel “Burmese” and
conceptualize the borders of what would now be “their” nation. The wartime
armed forces provided “the institutional basis for the idea of a sovereign,
territorially defined ‘Burma’ [which] was indigenized for the first time in modern
history.”68 Callahan’s emphasis on the significance of a Bamar majority armed
forces to the idea of Burma, through its defense of national sovereignty, illustrates
how the narrative of “in-group, out-group; do-bama and thudo-bama” continued
to drive the Bamar nationalists’ state-building policy. Because “hill populations
do not generally resemble the valley centers culturally, religiously, or
linguistically,” the independence and military readiness of indigenous groups such
as the Karen living within colonial borders challenged the idea of a homogenous
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Burmese nation.69 The idea that the Bamar were always under attack from both
real and imaginary enemies would serve as the “justification” for the persecution
of minorities in an idealized homogenous state.
Each of the aforementioned authors presents how and why Burmese
nationalism became radicalized and racialized; Matthew Bowser in “Partners in
Empire? Co-colonialism and the Rise of Anti-Indian Nationalism in Burma, 19301938” adds nuance to these arguments by presenting British economic policy as
the catalyst for anti-Indian sentiment becoming a part of Burmese nationalism.
Bowser argues that the Maistry system under the British brought cheap Indian
labor to Burma to the detriment of underpaid Indian laborers and the Burmese
displaced by Indian labor in the cities. The Maistry (translating to supervisor)
system in Burma consisted of the Maistry coercing lower caste individuals from
India into a debt-bondage labor system where illegal deduction of wages
effectively kept laborer enslaved to their Maistry.70 Rather than unfairly frame
Indian laborers as taking advantage of the demand for labor in Burma, Bowser
argues that “unemployment, low wages, long hours of work, disregard for the
welfare of labor,” which affected both the Burmese and Indian worker, “all may
be traced to one source, namely the free flow of labour” from the Maistry
system.71 Furthermore, Bowser conveys that it was the British vision “of a
productive class of Burmese owner-cultivators” which caused the Bamar
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agriculturalists to be in debt to Indian moneylenders. Bowser writes “[i]n practice,
though not by design, the [Burma Land and Revenue] Act ended up handing over
half of the cultivatable land in Burma to non-agriculturalist Indian bankers
through foreclosures. British officials did attempt to curb this process.”72 The
framing of Bamar anti-Indian sentiment as a product of British policies is
significant because it acknowledges that Indian minorities in Burma were victims
of British imperialism as well. Bowser’s work steers the reader away from this
narrative and illustrates that while Indian bankers could be considered “cocolonialists,” it was ultimately British decision-making that created this volatile
situation.
The rest of this thesis will demonstrate that the question of “who belongs”
in a post-colonial Burma was shaped by the divisive religious and racial rhetoric
of the Bamar independence movement over time. The concepts of dobama and
thudo-bama the Bamar nationalists used to categorize “who belonged” in their
envisioned community, while indigenous, took influences from pre-modern and
modern times both from Asian and European sources. Burmese nationalists used
Theravada Buddhism, from Sri Lanka, racial categorization, and nationalism from
Europe to build their “imagined communities.” Seeing how dobama and thudobama represent rhetoric based on a combination of old and new ideas, we must
consider the timeline by which nationalists synthesized these concepts. By
analyzing case studies in Burmese history between 1929-1939, we can better
understand what brought about the xenophobic turn in Burmese nationalism and
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the effect of said nationalism on subsequent events in time. Now we must ask, to
what degree did British colonial policies strengthen the xenophobic rhetoric of the
Bamar nationalists in the interim between these case studies. I will trace the
increasing radicalization and racialization of Bamar nationalism chronologically
through three case studies consisting of the Saya San Rebellion (1930-1932), the
debate over the separation of British Burma from British India (1929-1935), and
the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots. Extracts from government reports and nationalist
newspapers will show that the xenophobic rhetoric associated with dobama and
thudo-bama intensified in response to British colonial policy between 1929-1939.
At the conclusion of the final case study, the reader will recognize “who
belonged” in the Bamar nationalists’ vision of dobama and understand the
influences that slowly radicalized the Bamar nationalist ideology.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Return of a King, Prophet, or Pretender: Saya San’s Rebellion as a
Prelude for a “Burma for the Burmans”
On October 28th 1930, in a pagoda near Rangoon, an ex-Buddhist monk
surrounded himself with symbols of Burmese kingship: ruby earrings, gemstudded shoes, gem-studded sword, royal fan, and a white umbrella.73 Loyal
supporters tattooed with images of the Galon, the “fabulous bird of Hindu
mythology” in constant war with its adversary the Naga (serpent), proclaimed him
the “Thupannaka Galon Raja” or “Galon King.”74 This enlisted peasant army,
consisting of Bamar rice agriculturalists–some of whom were members of
Wunthanu village protection associations–swore an oath of loyalty to the “Galon
King,” which included the following statement:
Now at this time we are banded together to drive out all unbelievers… Till
we are free from the rule of the English we promise to harm no member of
the Galon brotherhood and neighbor to molest his wife nor to steal his
property… O ye four great Nats who guard the world … deliver us
quickly from the unbelievers and their government.75
This self-proclaimed king was Saya San, and the stage was set for the largest
peasant rebellion in recorded Burmese history.
On December 21, 1930, Saya San established his “capital” on Alaungtang
Hill in Tharrawaddy District, “where a royal city, known as a Buddharaja Myo, or
‘Buddhist King’s Town’ was ceremoniously plotted out.”76 Complete with a
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“ruby-studded banyan-wood lion throne,” Saya San declared war on the British
invaders resulting in the first of many confrontations. The following night, Saya
San’s followers raided villages in southeastern Tharrawaddy District looking for
firearms and killing village headmen and unsuspecting peasants alike.77 The
uprising would claim an estimated 1700 lives between 1930-1932.78
Despite proclaiming himself a king, with all the ceremony to legitimize
him as a Buddhist king, Saya San had neither a capital nor a throne within two
weeks of declaring war on the British. Any semblance of a new Buddhist
kingdom, in the context of physical territory, disappeared by January 1st, 1931,
when British troops successfully stormed Alaungtang Hill and drove Saya San
and the rebel leadership including U Aung Hla, Bo Aung Shwe, and Bo Aung
Pwe into hiding. However, the loss of the Alaungtang Hill was not the decisive
blow to the rebellion that the British envisioned; throughout January 1931,
insurgent operations spread throughout Lower Burma with rebel leaders
coordinating attacks against police stations and government representatives.79
Saya San’s followers still believed in the divinity of their prophet king and his
movement; thus, the loss of a physical capital did not greatly affect the morale of
his followers.
By August of 1931, the British had captured, tried, and sentenced Saya
San through a Special Rebellion Tribunal which had been previously organized to
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process the large numbers of people charged during the rebellion. Saya San’s
lawyers included nationalist leaders Dr. Baw Maw and “Tharrawaddy” U Saw
who represented the cautious and boldly ethnonationalist camps of the Bamar
nationalist movement respectively. The execution of Saya San on November 28th,
1931, dealt a blow to the rebellion, but an indecisive one as British sources
reported disorganized bands of Saya San’s followers engaging in dacoity
(banditry) and wanton violence.80 While British reports classified these acts as
indiscriminate violence, we have to note how such a slanderous narrative aids in
the colonial government’s efforts to erode support for Saya San’s remaining
followers and his potential for martyrdom. Continuing resistance against the
British suggests that the length Saya San went to legitimize himself as a spiritual
and political leader was successful. However, a change in the British narrative of
the uprising as one of organized resistance to dacoity suggests that government
repression, through an increased military presence and censorship, contributed to
the realization that challenging the colonial state through violence was futile.
Saya San’s Rebellion represents one of the most decisive actions taken by
a group of Bamar religious and political leaders in establishing, however shortly,
a state free from British influence. The Rebellion helps us define Burmese
national identity because its causes, organization, and effects are intertwined with
the intense Bamar ethnonationalism of the 1930s that helped create an
independent Burma. In this chapter, I will argue that the Saya San Rebellion
embodied anti-colonial sentiment and traditional nationalism centered around
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restoring Buddhist kingship as a solution to the modern economic grievances
directed at British rule. The unity of agriculturalists, the General Council of
Burmese Associations (GCBA), and Wunthanu Athins (“own race” village
associations) around the idea that the effects of British economic policy and a
disregard for Buddhist ideals were harmful to Burmese livelihood made the fight
for a Bamar Buddhist Burmese state appealing to the masses. I will show that
while the Saya San Rebellion was neither intended to be racialized nor intended to
start a modern nationalist movement, it highlighted grievances and provided a
platform for the Bamar to develop the rhetoric of “in-groups” and “out-groups.”

Causes of Rebellion: The Fall of the Headmen and the “Owner-Cultivator”
Given the scale of the Saya San Rebellion, it should not be surprising that
extensive research has been devoted to its causes and effects. Modern historians
most often attribute the causes of the rebellion to socioeconomic factors, in
contrast to original British interpretations which described the rebellion as
“superstition plain and simple.”81 To better understand how the Saya San
Rebellion can be used to answer the question, “whose nation is this,” it is
necessary to examine the causes and narratives of the Rebellion.
British rule in Burma required the destruction of the Kombaung Monarchy
and the Buddhist welfare state system.82 However, the overturning of an old
system does not necessarily lead to the seditionist sentiments expressed by Saya
San and his followers. As political scientist James C. Scott has argued, armed
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insurrection is often the weapon of last resort for the peasantry to protest changes
that threaten their livelihoods. Armed insurrection requires time that could be
spent in agricultural cultivation and rebellion can even cost the life of the peasant;
therefore, to rebel is to “risk everything” and represents a tactic used when
conditions become intolerable.83 More commonly, “peasants moved into the hills
and forests surrounding the Dry Zone or traveled south into the vast wilderness of
the Irrawaddy delta” in a form of avoidance protest.84 The subsistence peasant
household is only concerned with cultivating enough food for themselves and for
storage in the event of natural disaster. The British introduced capitalist economy
aimed at maximizing profits was alien to subsistence farmers in Burma but did
not necessarily threaten their livelihoods from the outset. The influx of migrants
pursuing rice cultivation from Upper Burma to the Lower Burma Delta pursuing
rice cultivation increased from 311,000 in 1881 to 411,000 in 1901.85 An increase
in rice cultivators in Lower Burma suggests that Bamar agriculturists were willing
to take part as owner-cultivators in the British capitalist system. However, in the
name of profit, the British tore down the traditional patron-client relationships and
communal arrangements which provided food security to the peasantry. The precolonial mandala polity that allowed for geographic mobility was replaced by a
colonial state where the importance of land ownership limited the feasibility of
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“avoidance protest.”86 The peasantry now had to balance the benefits of becoming
a cultivator “owner” with the deficiencies of the British system; Scott provides a
useful term to describe the peasants’ definition and level of tolerance for
exploitation – the “moral economy of the peasant.”87
The Saya San Rebellion was a product of British instituted changes that
threatened the Bamar peasants’ moral economy to such a degree that they would
be willing to risk their lives. To understand why the peasantry rebelled, we must
examine their socioeconomic conditions before and after the British invasion.
During the Kombaung period, myo village units were governed by a myothugyi
(village headmen), a hereditary position. Parimal Ghosh argues in Brave Men of
the Hills that despite his hereditary position, the myothugyi was an advocate for
his people and often perceived as such.88 While the myothugyi possessed policing
powers and collected taxes, abusing these powers was unlikely due to the position
central government’s tendency to allow locals to choose their myothugyi.89
Because the people ultimately chose their myothugyi, it was in his best interest to
advocate for his people against unfavorable government policies such as tax
increases. Therefore, the relationship between the myothugyi and the people was
based on trust, mutual benefit, and reciprocity often described as a patron-client
relationship and a characteristic of pre-colonial Southeast Asian states.
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The British invasion and the introduction of a “Village System,” where the
village became the basic district administrative unit run by British appointed
“village headmen,” removed the myothugyis’ obligations in favor of a patronclient system that deprived peasants of their most able advocate and patron.90 The
1887 “Regulation to Provide for the Establishment of a Village-System in Upper
Burma,” created by Charles Crosthwaite, aimed to “pacify” Upper Burma where
rebellion by ex-Kombaung officials continued to take place.91 The goal of this
program was never to help the people but to promote stability during the
development of a colonial state. Thus, “the Village System” sanctioned state
revenue extraction, stabilized through policing, by transforming the village
headmen into salaried bureaucrats loyal to the colonial government.
The British expanded their control over Burmese villages by appropriating
successful aspects of the Kombaung village headmen system while modifying it
to make the suppression of dissent easier. Village headmen retained policing and
tax collecting authority, transforming them into arbiters for British machinations.
As expressed by Crosthwaite’s predecessor, Charles Bernard, “[t]he most
important agency for maintaining order, pacifying the country, and collecting the
revenue, will be the indigenous local officials, such as the myothugyis and
thugyis,” and “[a] District Officer who is able to re-establish the majority of the
old thugyis in subordination to the present order of things, and to obtain good new
thugyis of local influence for vacant circles, will have made the most important
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step towards restoring his district to order.”92 The village headmen would no
longer be a member of a patron-client system “involving a largely instrumental
friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his
own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of
lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support.”93
Instead, the village headmen would now serve as colonial bureaucrats, appointed
by the British and charged with enforcing colonial policy through their policing
power.
Rather than patrons, the myothugyi and thugyi became servants of the
British; there was no need for most village headmen to take the extra step in
considering the moral economy of the people when governing. While the
myothugyis had historically collected the thathameda tax (household tax) while
remaining exempt from it themselves, the patron-client dynamics had served as a
check on myothugyis under the Kombaung. Under the British, the headmen did
not receive fixed salaries, rather, their income was from a commission based on
the amount of taxes collected from a village tract.94 This policy encouraged
extortion of the villagers as the headmen was paid according to the amount of
taxes he collected. With fewer checks to the myothugyis’ power under the British,
the peasantry rightly began to perceive the myothugyis as members of the
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colonizing group. Saya San’s followers singled out and murdering many village
headmen between 1930-32, in an act of confrontation as opposed to avoidance
protest, illustrates the degree to which the British manipulated the myothugyi role.
The privatization of land ownership by the British, an aspect of the Village
System, contrasted pre-colonial modes of land ownership and shifted Burmese
agriculture further away from a patron-client system. The Kombaung monarchy
had divided the land into three types: royal, official, and private land.95 While
royal and official land were owned by the king and government officials
respectively, the designation of private land requires its own separate description.
Due to the high land area to population ratio found in pre-colonial Burma, as well
as throughout Southeast Asia, private land ownership was often disorganized.
Rights to land could be obtained by the peasant through clearing and cultivating
land which has not been previously settled. While this private land was hereditary
and could be sold, the lack of royal oversight on private land, apart from the
household tax, allowed squatters to acquire abandoned private land without
penalty.96
The British desire to develop Burma into a rice exporting region meant the
cultivation of the maximum amount of land in the shortest time possible. Through
the “new” squatter and patta systems, peasants could occupy land and pay taxes
or apply for a government grant in which highly undeveloped land was given to
the cultivator with reduced taxes, respectively. However, the capitalist intentions
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of the British created a new market for land speculation and moneylending,
leading to the loss of land from the peasantry. The high influx of migrants to the
Burma Delta who required capital to develop land opened a market for
moneylending. Moneylenders, especially the Chettiars (moneylending caste from
Southern India), were happy to provide low-interest loans to cultivators; however,
should misfortune befall the cultivator the moneylender would often foreclose the
land to acquire the payment for their loan.

Crosthwaite’s Village System, though unfavorable for the Bamar rice
cultivator, was overshadowed by the issue of diminishing land ownership by
Bamar “owner-cultivators.” The agriculturalists’ loss of land to moneylenders and
landlords increased continuously throughout the early 1900s. Between 1901-02,
agriculturalists owned 82.8 percent of agricultural land in lower Burma. This
number drops to 70 percent between 1925-30 and declines even further to 56.6
percent between 1930-35 during the peak of the Great Depression.97 The
significant loss of land to non-agriculturalists, especially non-residents, put
increasing pressure on the moral economy of the agriculturist whose status
transformed from “owner-cultivator” to “tenant” after the loss of land. Bamar
peasants almost universally demonized Chettiar moneylenders as servants of the
colonial system much like the new village headmen. There was no relief from the
household tax and some peasants perceived an increasing number of immigrants
from India-proper as a threat. In contrast to the British colonial authorities,
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historians such as Michael Adas, Matrii Aung-Thwin, and James C. Scott have
come to the consensus that these economic conditions helped instigate the Saya
San Rebellion which flared up when these conditions were at their worst.

A Galon King: The Effect of Folk Beliefs in Developing Burmese Peasant Identity
Buddhist belief and identity had a tremendous effect on Saya San’s ability
to draw fanatical support and helped determine what beliefs would fit within a
Burmese national identity. Saya San’s movement can be best described as a
general anti-colonial movement but associating it with modern nationalism is
inaccurate. If anything, the Saya San Rebellion’s bottom-up character exemplifies
the traditional form of nationalism described in Chapter One, in which followers’
loyalty was to a person and ideology as opposed to a state.
The Bamar peasants did not make a claim for a nation-state, but rather
sought a return to a pre-colonial Buddhist kingdom governed by patron-client
relationships in opposition to the British capitalist system. It is important to
remember that the pre-colonial Buddhist kingdoms from the 17th century onwards
became more centralized and “its identification with monarchs who were
considered to be ethnically and culturally Bamar, led communities and individuals
to accept the state’s definition of their cultural orientation.”98 Thus, a return to a
pre-colonial Buddhist kingdom characterized by the most recent, the Kombaung
(1752-1885), would also be a return to a Bamar culturally dominated society.
Saya San appealed to peasants by evoking uniquely Burmese Buddhist beliefs
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such as proclaiming himself as a new Sektya-Min, “a benevolent ruler who would
appear at the end of Buddhism’s age of decline.”99 The Sektya-Min would become
the future Buddha and restore “world moral order,” a powerful claim. Saya San
promised a better future for the peasants by returning Burma to a mythical
Buddhist past.
Building on the significance of Burmese Buddhist mythology, the
peasants’ held onto the traditional belief in the return of the minlaung, “a just
Burman king or prince who would drive away the European heretics and restore
monarchical rule and an idealized pre-European order.”100 This prophetic rhetoric
illustrates that Saya San’s imagined kingdom would be created for Buddhists with
no exceptions. Given that the strength of a prophecy is determined by the faith of
its believers, Saya San’s reliance on prophecy to unite his followers reflects the
degree to which Buddhism was a part of Bamar peasant identity. Reciprocally, the
peasantry’s willingness to go to war on the grounds of Burmese Buddhist
prophecy reflects why Buddhist village organizations such as the YMBA and later
GCBA were integral in recruiting support for the Rebellion.101 In light of Saya
San’s goal to construct a Buddhist kingdom and his ability to convince others to
sacrifice their lives for this vision, the Saya San Rebellion illustrates that many
Burmese peasants desired a post-colonial society to belong to the Buddhists.
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British accounts often portray the Saya San Rebellion as “superstition pure
and simple,” to deflect their economic mismanagement; however, the rebels’ use
of talismans and tattoos with the belief these symbols provided invulnerability to
firearms reflects the inherent Bamar Buddhist doctrine of this anti-colonial
movement. Saya San was a skilled tattoo artist and almost all his followers were
tattooed or carried “enchanted” items in the form of flags and potions.102 These
symbols and items not only made identifying members of the rebellion easier but
also represented a set of traditional beliefs unique to Burma and integral in
distinguishing Burmese Buddhism from other forms of the religion.103 The value
of charms and tattoos comes from the faith that these symbols would “confer
immunity to the hazards of battle.”104 A rebel force that believes they are
invincible is more willing to resort to violence and commit their lives to the cause.
British accounts of the bravado of the Galon rebels include how:
They attacked unflinchingly against rifle and Lewis gun fire of one of the
finest shooting regiments in the [British] Indian army. The attackers went
down in their tens and twenties, but they still came on, storming over the
lines of the dead. The continuous fire met them and the stuttering Lewis
guns tore down their ranks…armed with only spears and swords, … they
boldly charged the military police, who easily repulsed them with rifles.105
This open willingness to sacrifice one’s life on account of symbols illustrates the
influence of folk beliefs on Bamar peasants and their genuine frustration towards
the colonial system. However, these symbols as noted by Aung-Thwin were not
universally revered in Theravada Buddhism but were part of animist belief from
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within the borders of colonial Burma. The participants of the largest armed
Burmese anti-colonialist uprising, believing in the power of these symbols,
illustrate that the visions for an independent Burmese state would not only be one
for Buddhists but also one tied to the specific Burmese form of Buddhism.
A distinguishing feature of Saya San’s followers were their tattoos, a
tradition from pre-colonial Burmese kingdoms used to mark one’s status,
especially in the military.106 The significance of tattooing to the Bamar is
emphasized in the following statement from U Arthapa:
Have you not heard that the Galon Raja has risen in the east? You will
have to be distinguished by being tattooed. If you are not tattooed, you
will have your heads cut off when the Galon Raja arrives… What is the
good of depending on the heathen? We must rely on our own people. Saya
San will soon be coming. We must get back our own country. I have
received my orders from Saya San. Look at the dah which I am now
holding. If you do not listen to my orders, you all will be beheaded.107
U Arthapa not only conveys the importance of tattooing to Bamar culture but also
illustrates the genuine belief in Saya San’s prophetic claims to build a new
society. The phrase “our people” looped into a statement predicting an
apocalyptic event for the non-tattooed foreigners illustrates a belief that those who
do not practice the traditions from within Burma’s borders will be swept away by
Saya San. Here, the reverence towards Saya San extends beyond Buddhist belief
and into indigenous beliefs in the Nats (indigenous god-like spirits) and the power
of tattoos. The presence of tattoos on the Saya San’s followers, coupled with this
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prophecy suggesting that the non-tattooed will be vanquished, conveys the
importance of pre-colonial Bamar culture to Saya San’s followers. For example,
“the Burmans alone tattooed legs and bellies,” thus specific tattooing practices
became an integral way for the Bamar to distinguish themselves from other ethnic
groups.108 Charms and tattoos are more Burmese than Buddhist and the
dependence on these symbols reflected the rebels’ attempt to build a Bamar
kingdom; Figure One, where one of Saya San’s followers receives a tattoo on his
leg, exemplifies this. We know that the Bamar rebels believed in Saya San’s
prophesy, the power of tattoos, charms, and the Galon, evidenced by frontal
assaults against British machine guns. The Saya San Rebellion represented a
reawakening of indigenous culture, led by Bamar peasants, that dreamt of a
Buddhist state with indigenous Burmese characteristics.

Figure 1: Amulets, Firearms, and Tattoos of Saya San’s Followers. Newspaper clipping from the
Illustrated London News containing images of a Galon flag, rebel weapons, and tattoo designs.109
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Examining the rebel oath, we see the great extent to which the indigenous
characteristics of Buddhism in Burma provided the rebels with confidence in their
fight to create a new society. The first part of the rebel oath was titled “Inviting
the Gods” and consisted of a call for divine assistance from indigenous Nat spirits
in the name of Buddhism by saying:
Ye gods, who inhabit the universe: Come today to this place and listen to
the solemn oath, taken by these men, who are desirous of promoting
Buddhism, the sacred religion of the Buddha, the King of Kings. Oh Gods:
Listen to their solemn asservation and take down the names of these men,
who are resolved to do away with the heretics in the cause of their
religion.110
In this passage, the rebels call to the Nats to listen to the rebels’ willingness to die
in the name of Buddhism. There is a cry for divine guardianship by the rebels and
a hope that by “inviting the Gods,” the rebels would receive protection by the
gods in the same manner as tattoos and charms. It appears that the indigenous
gods are the ones providing aid with a promise to promote Buddhism as
justification by the rebels for their protection. The Saya San Rebellion was “an
expression of nativistic and revitalistic beliefs and hopes held by Burman pongyis
and agriculturalists,” as shown by Saya San’s Buddhist coronation ceremony and
the rebel invocation to the animist Nats.111 This emphasis on animist belief and its
power to incite acts of bravado maintains that the rebels believed their Burmese
state was to be based on traditions from within Burma’s borders.
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Forming an Out-Group
Saya San’s followers fought to reconstruct a pre-colonial Buddhist
kingdom, with Burmese Buddhist characteristics devoid of the British. However,
to understand the importance of the Saya San Rebellion to the growth of Bamar
ethnic nationalism in the 1930s, it is important to trace how religious nationalism
paralleled the strengthening of ethnic identities which led to outright violence
against ethnic minorities, particularly Indians, in the late-1930s. I argue that the
Saya San Rebellion was not caused by anti-Indian sentiment, but more generally
against the British economic system which had driven many peasants into losing
their land to Chettiar Indian moneylenders.
A perception that the Chettiars, like village headmen, were co-colonialists
drove rebels to single out Indian communities for attack, but this was only
accessory to the goal of expelling all co-colonialists in general. This is supported
by British reports which cite “a racial bias against Europeans and Chinamen as
well as against Indians” as a cause of rebellion.112 However, the Saya San
Rebellion laid the foundation for anti-Chettiar sentiment to develop into
widespread violence towards Indians in the absence of British economic
responsibility. While village headmen, Chettiars, and police officers represented
the most obvious agents of the colonial state were the first target of Saya San’s
followers, eventually, members of whole ethnicities who often made up a high
portion of these respective groups became targets. Over time, there was less
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nuance in distinguishing between targets by Saya San’s followers due to rising
ethnonationalism. By looking at inter-ethnic conflict during the Saya San
Rebellion, we will be able to understand how the Bamar anti-colonialist
movement did not begin with xenophobia as the backbone of its proposed
domestic policy in the early 1930s.
By December of 1930, the effects of the Great Depression most
significantly affected Bamar agriculturalists causing them to default on their loans
en masse. Rice paddy prices dropped from around 475 Rupees in December 1927
to 232.8 Rupees in December 1930 for 100 baskets of 75 lbs. each.113 While
December of 1930 was the lowest paddy prices would drop, paddy prices declined
on average between 1930-1935 when compared to prices in 1927. This coupled
with the increasing export of rice to India between 1932/33 to 1933/34 and
competition in the rice export market from French-Indochina, Siam, and Japan
caused paddy prices in Burma to remain depressed.114 With the main source of
income for the agriculturalist not enough to pay back loans, the agriculturalist
handed over their land to non-agriculturalists. Meanwhile, Chettiar moneylenders
loaned 100-120 million rupees to Burmese agriculturists annually which
represented a fraction of the 330-400 million rupees in long-term loans to
agriculturalists. While these figures support Nalini Chakravarti’s claim that Indian
capital was responsible for building Burma, from the perspective of the
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agriculturalist, the Chettiars became the most obvious group to blame for the
transfer of land.115
The impact of debt to the Chettiars is best described by a passage from the
Report of the Land and Agriculture Committee published in 1938 that reads:
In regard to the rebellion in the Dedaye Township of the Pyapon District,
it was found that many of the villagers who took part were in the grip of
the moneylenders. Much of the land in the neighborhood had been lost to
the Chettyars within a short period preceding the rebellion. The leader of
the Dedaye rebellion and one of his principal lieutenants had recently lost
land to the Chettyars.116
Both the British and the Bamar peasants blame Chettiar moneylenders for causing
the land alienation that helped spark the Saya San Rebellion. The agriculturalist
took the position of a client of the Chettiar patron without the security and
reciprocity found in the pre-colonial Kombaung system. Capitalism made the act
of borrowing money purely transactional and the Bamar client was now in a
subservient position to the Chettiars. A loss of land coupled with a blow to Bamar
pride transformed the Chettiars into “public enemy number 1.”117
An important distinction to make is that Bamar peasant grievances were
specifically against the Chettiars and village headmen at the start of the Saya San
Rebellion. A British account from the period by B. R. Pearn deduced, “the
Burman cultivator suffered not merely the disaster of losing his land but also, in
many cases, the unwelcome experience of becoming either a hired laborer or the
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tenant of a rack-renting landlord of another race.”118 This characterizes the Saya
San Rebellion as not only an expression of disdain against the economic system
but also an outpouring of hatred against feeling second-class to foreign capitalists.
This sentiment was more specific to Chettiars than Indians in general as the great
majority of Indians in Burma were laborers themselves, not landlords. The Bamar
rebels did not hate the Chettiars solely because they were foreigners but because
the Bamar felt swindled out of their land. A virtual dependency on Chettiar capital
further convinced the peasantry that they were second-class citizens in their state.
As land was the agriculturalists’ most valuable asset, losing land meant losing
power and the ability to make decisions. Now the agriculturist had to work to pay
rent in addition to subsistence disrupting their ability to donate to the Sangha as
well, this was unbearable to their moral economy and pride.
It was not Indians in general who inflamed the Saya San Rebellion but
rather an economic system with loopholes for exploitation by both Chettiar and
Bamar moneylenders. The destruction of old social systems further inhibited the
peasants’ ability to recover from the damage done in the new capitalist economic
system. There is a distinction between grievances levied against the Chettiars and
the general anti-Indian sentiment which developed over time. Indian immigrants
to Burma worked in a diverse array of fields but could most often be found
working in mining, transportation, domestic transport, public administration, and
policing roles.119 Given the rural nature of the Saya San Rebellion, it was unlikely
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that the presence of many Indians contributed to anti-Indian xenophobia and
violence simply because Indians living in Lower Burma were concentrated in
cities. While the Indian population grew from 136,504 to 849,381 persons
between 1872 to 1931, this represented at most 11% of the total population of
Lower Burma including cities such as Rangoon. With only 3.7% of Indians in
Lower Burma working in agriculture, “it remains that the work of agriculture was
predominantly affected by the indigenous peoples, and that the Indian element
played proportionally a small part.”120 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
the anti-Indian sentiment of the Saya San Rebellion began as anti-Chettiar
sentiment specifically. This is in contrast to cities such as Rangoon where the
Indian population outnumbered the Bamar population leading to competition for
menial labor jobs. The anti-Indian xenophobia found in the Saya San Rebellion
emerged in response to Chettiar land grabs rather than Indian immigration and
competition for labor. However, anti-Chettiar sentiment in rural Burma would
quickly become an exploitable tool for urban Bamar ethnonationalists to develop
a new national identity centered on being anti-Indian.
The perceived threat of the Chettiars specifically as a cause of the Saya
San Rebellion extends even further back to the late 19th century. In regard to the
years 1897-98, James MacKenna reported that “the native [of India] is only
dangerous to the Burman when he is, in addition to a land-owner, a money-lender,
and then really only because he has more business instinct and methods than suits
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the causal Burman.”121 The Bamar agriculturalists perceived Indian moneylenders
specifically, as opposed to Indian laborers in the cities and farms, as a threat to
their livelihood thirty-three years prior to the Saya San Rebellion. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that unfair moneylending practices formed the main
grievance of the Bamar agriculturalists as opposed to the ethnicity of the
moneylenders. Mackenna also notes that “[o]n the whole, however, the native of
India gets on very well with his neighbor Burman and is a useful member of the
community.”122 We see that by the start of the Saya San Rebellion, Indian labor
was not competitive with Burmese labor in the fields while the Bamar had felt the
burden of debt to moneylenders for decades. Comparing these two statements
from the same page of Mackenna’s report illustrates that the moneylending
practices of the Chettiars, as opposed to their ethnicity, were not welcome by the
Bamar peasantry. However, it was only a matter of time before the Bamar
peasants expressed their grievances towards the flawed moneylending system
through demonizing Indians as a “race” and eventually launching indiscriminate
attacks against them.
When Saya San declared war on the British, his proclamation illustrated
that the initial goals of his movement and the rhetoric used was not to throw out
minorities from Burma but rather to expel those obstructing traditional society:
the British, village headmen, Chettiars, and anyone perceived to be a cocolonialist. Saya San proclaimed:
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I have to declare war for the benefit of Rahan, Religion, and inhabitants. It
is not because I like to oppress the people. Englishmen only are our
enemies. We will only suppress the enemies. We do not wish to oppress
Indians, Chinamen, Shans, and Karens. We will grant a pardon if you
surrender yourselves and your arms through you are drawing pay from the
Englishmen. Whoever surrender themselves and admit their folly will be
granted a pardon.123
The explicit statement that ethnic minorities, first and foremost Indians, were not
the primary enemies of the rebellion reflects that Saya San did not begin his
movement as an anti-Indian Rebellion but as an anti-British insurrection.
However, Saya San characterizes these minorities as possessing predetermined
guilt for in his view collaborating with the British. He offers a pardon to these
groups of people only if they “admit their folly” suggesting that ethnic minorities
such as Indians, as well as broader agents of the colonial state–village headmen–
were guilty of being part of the British system and needed to prove their
innocence rather than Saya San having to prove their guilt. The belief that
Indians, Chinese, Shan, and Karen minorities possessed inherent guilt, from
upholding the British system, establishes that Saya San’s followers would not
welcome these groups into their vision for a new Burmese kingdom unless these
groups confessed their “folly” or subscribed to Saya San’s millenarism. There was
an inherent distrust of minorities by Saya San’s followers illustrated when “on 9th
of October a large rebel ration party from Wettu Hill happened to meet a Karen
man and two Karen women outside of Kyauksayitgon near Wagyaung and killed
them because they were Karens.”124 This extremity of distrust manifested itself in
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open violence against ethnic minorities such as the Karen and conveyed to
observers that the rebels’ vision for a Burmese community would favor Bamar
Buddhists. The prejudice against ethnic minorities in Burma from this account, as
well as Saya San’s proclamation, set up ethnic minorities as scapegoats for the
grievances against British rule. While there was a way for these ethnic minorities
and broader perceived co-colonialists to join the “in-group,” co-colonialists
needed to prove their loyalty to Saya San and his followers’ vision of a reformed
Burmese Buddhist community.
Anti-colonial sentiment as opposed to anti-Indian xenophobia as the main
cause of the Saya San Rebellion can be best described when examining its first
victims who were primarily Bamar village headmen. The attacks against headmen
were immediate when “on the 16th of May 41 Myoma rebels, with 4 guns and 4
revolvers, attacked the house of Banbwegon headmen, the Ledi headmen, and the
Nyaungbintha headmen. The latter was abducted and late murdered in cold
blood.”125 In contrast to the myothugyis of the pre-colonial era, “the headmen is
appointed by the Deputy Commissioner…may try persons…[and] they collect the
revenue of the village or a fine inflicted on the village.”126 Violence towards their
fellow Bamar illustrates that the Saya San Rebellion’s chief objective was not to
persecute Indians per se but remove all elements of British rule including cocolonist Bamar headmen. No one was safe as “[a] reign of terror spread over the
countryside; anybody suspected of Government sympathies was liable to be
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murdered.”127 The wide range of victims of the Saya San Rebellion shows that the
process of reforming a Burmese Buddhist state would see the purging of all
elements, including people, associated with the British administration.
Despite Saya San’s followers and sympathizers possessing diverse ideas
on how to best support the independence movement, his followers recognized that
increased British policing would only increase the strength of the anti-colonial
movement. While this rebellion had the intent to put a new government into
power through violence, some elements of the rebellion refused to condone the
violence. The GCBA and Wunthanu Athins, instrumental in spreading the word
about the rebellion, in many cases, stood against the actions of the rebels. GCBA
branch leader “U Soe Thein and his secretary did not agree to resort to violence to
gain their political ends.” Despite that “[i]t is not possible that many other
members of the U Soe Thein GCBA and many members of the affiliated
associations to be ignorant to the plans of Saya San.”128 What did unite the bands
of rebels and nationalist organizations was a hatred of British rule. In the
Legislative Council debates in the wake of the uprising, representative U Aye
argued that “[t]he Government must change with the times and be responsive to
popular aspirations instead of killing all political agitation…Lord Irwin [the
Viceroy of India] has shown the way in India and has left no stone unturned to
win the confidence of the Indian extremists.”129 U Aye proposes that British
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crackdowns of unrest only bred more discontent which eventually caused the
Saya San Rebellion. He cites Lord Irwin’s suppression of dissent in India as
spurring Indian extremism, warning that repression in Burma would lead to
outright violence. This gives credit to the point that the Saya San Rebellion was a
broad reaction to decades of British oppression, rather than against one specific
ethnic minority. However, British power in Burma relied on many different
collaborators including, broadly speaking, village headmen and Chettiars. Despite
U Aye’s comments, British counterinsurgency operations and a lack of action
paved the way for specific targets of Bamar wrath to emerge–a consequence of
British divide and rule.

“The Indian” as the Enemy: A Product of British Counterinsurgency
The Saya San Rebellion was a reaction to the foreign destruction of
Burmese pride in addition to a failure of the agriculturalists’ moral economies.
Starting from the first consolidated Burmese kingdom of Pagan and ending with
the Kombaung, “the Burmans, although a small and hitherto not very well-known
people are proud of their nationality.”130 With Saya San’s attempt to fulfill Bamar
wishes for a glorious return of the Buddhist state, the crushing of the rebellion by
the British Indian Army contributed to the characterization of all Indians in
Burma as the enemy rather than solely the Chettiars. As “the Burmans are a very
proud people and have no mean opinions of themselves considering themselves
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vastly superior to Indians,” the death of Bamar reels at the hands of Indian
soldiers was particularly inflammatory and insulting to Bamar identity and
pride.131 The Saya San Rebels took on the role of warriors, a position revered
since the first Burmese dynasty, and their defeat was emasculating for the Bamar
men. Because Bamar men could not be legally warriors as “enlistment of
Burmans in the British army was abruptly discontinued in 1887,” taking arms was
a symbolic return to a pre-British society.132 Combat between rebels and
government troops was the final stand for the Bamar warrior making defeat feel
even more bitter. Immediately after the outbreak of rebellion and Saya San’s
establishment of his “kingdom,” the British dispatched the 2/15th Punjab
Regiment of the British Indian Army to suppress the rebellion in yet another act
of divide and rule.133 The British used the 2/15th Punjab Regiment in search and
destroy missions where they “marched up from the north-east corner of the Insein
District along the Yomas [mountains]. The object was to locate any rebel camps
and that might exist in the Yomas, and if possible to drive the rebels down onto
the cordon of Military posts along the edge of the foot-hills.”134 Though jungle
warfare was difficult for the British attackers, these operations were largely
successful with rebel resistance transforming into disorganized dacoity as military
efforts continued. The British took the last pieces of land, the mountains, which
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the Bamar rebels believed to be their own. To Saya San’s followers and Bamar
onlookers it appeared that Indian foot soldiers had stolen Bamar inheritance.
In addition to employing Indian soldiers, the British also relied upon the
hill tribes of Burma such as the Karen people in their counterinsurgency
operations. It was the 3/20th Burma Rifles drawn from the Karen, Kachin, and
Chin ethnic groups that marched up Alaungtang Hill and scattered Saya San’s
base of operations on December 31st, 1930.135 The use of troops levied from
ethnic minorities gave the impression to the Bamar majority that ethnic minorities
were the cause of their oppression. For the majority, small grievances became
unbearable as the British tightened their grip while making colonial troops the
face of British occupation. While civilian casualties are almost inevitable in a
counterinsurgency operation, to the Bamar, every civilian loss caused by the
British Indian Army felt like a personal attack by Indians and the Karen in
particular. U Saw describes the Bamar sentiment at the time writing:
Whole villages were burnt down by the Military without warning and
villagers–men, women and children–had to flee for their lives sans home,
sans food, sans clothing. innocent villagers were shot down by the Crown
forces which comprise of the Regulars, the Military, the Civil Police and
the Karen Volunteers.136
The brutality of the British counterinsurgency destroyed the lives of the poorest
villagers as the “rebel” villages indiscriminately destroyed were inhabited by
peasants who often had lost their savings to the Chettiars. These peasants
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perceived the actions of the British Indian Army as a second wave of hardship
unleashed by ethnic minorities in Burma. With such a great degree of loss, it was
easy for the peasant to wrongfully associate their Indian neighbors with the
murder of civilians by soldiers. The rapid British military mobilization against the
Bamar peasantry created an environment ripe for Bamar revenge against their
perceived Indian and Karen enemies.
The extent to which the British use of Indian troops bred discontent from
the Bamar can even be seen in colonial government newspapers. U Saw cited a
statement from the Rangoon Times, a newspaper sympathetic to the colonial
government, in his own condemnation of the British response. The Rangoon
Times wrote on May 15th, 1931:
There is news of fresh Indian troops coming to Burma. Whether they will
be used as a striking force or merely for the purpose of demonstration is
not yet known. Neither the actual use nor the show of military strength is
the cure for hunger. Every man of discretionary age cannot fail to realize
the military resourcefulness of a modern civilized government. Further,
communal feeling is bad enough without additional cause and the
extended employment of Indian troops in a purely local rising is likely to
accentuate it. There is yet time for His Excellency to assert that he is
above all a peace-loving pro-Burman.137
Warnings against the use of Indian troops from a government mouthpiece
illustrated the growing resentment against Indians in general by the Bamar. If this
statement had emerged from Bamar nationalist newspapers such as Thuriya or
New Burma then there would be a good reason to scrutinize the statement;
however, its presence in English within a government newspaper suggests that
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Bamar anger towards Indians evolved to such virulence that even government
sympathizers demanded change. Discontent was visible in society and the
government had now at least received warnings about the volatile situation that
they had caused through divide and rule. We can deduce that the Bamar felt great
anger towards Indians as a product of military operations against the Bamar
rebels. It is telling that the author describes anti-Indian sentiment as a “communal
feeling” because it means that by 1931 the Bamar community had begun to group
Indians more broadly as their enemy as opposed to solely the Chettiars as seen in
the early stages of the Rebellion. The rural Bamar rebels and urban nationalists, as
a result of British policies, had created an environment so hostile to Indians that
the broader Indian community did feel unwelcome as “[t]he number [of Indians]
that had fled [Burma] fearing these outrages amounted to about 15,000 up to the
end of May [1931].”138 Now the Bamar began to take issue with Indians because
they were not Bamar, rather than with Indian moneylending practices or
competition for labor in the cities. The plea to the King that he should assert
himself as “peace-loving” and “pro-Burman” foreshadows that being anti-Burman
would mean continued violence. These two phrases juxtaposed in the context of
the Saya San Rebellion suggest that for even government sympathizers, peace
could only be achieved if Burma was a pro-Burman state in all respects.
Therefore, the suppression efforts against the Saya San Rebellion strengthened the
idea of a Burma only for the Burmans and planted the seed for ethnic nationalism.
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What distinguished the military operations during the Saya San Rebellion
from those of the three Anglo-Burmese wars was not the participants but the
visibility and compounding effects of oppression in the former. The high literacy
of the Bamar population and the emergence of a vernacular press allowed for the
dissemination of information to become even more efficient for nationalist
leaders.139 Newspapers such as New Burma published images of desecrated rebel
bodies with the intent of turning people against the British regime. The Indians
and Karen peoples who comprised a majority of the British forces in Burma could
not escape association with British atrocities. While the battles of the previous
Anglo-Burmese wars were not often directly felt by the civilian population, the
vernacular press reinforced the narrative that the Bamar were the ultimate victims
of British and now Indian oppression. Following Figure Two, U Saw includes an
image of two Bamar farmers sitting down shikoing in front of police and specifies
that there is an Indian sepoy sitting on a heap of paddy.140 As the shikoing is a
gesture of submission, this image tries to convince the Bamar viewer that Indians
are not only serving as occupiers but also controlling the peasants’ subsistence
livelihoods through intimidation. The act of sitting on top of the paddy
symbolizes foreign ownership of the Bamar peasants’ means of survival. U Saw’s
use of these images in succession is a deliberate attempt to portray Indians as the
arch-nemesis of the Bamar. The Saya San Rebellion provided the vernacular press
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with a platform to espouse their rhetoric of “Burma for Burmans and not for
Indians.”141

Figure 2: Decapitated Heads of Saya San’s Followers. The sixteen heads of rebels killed by British
forces in the Prome District. New Burma originally published this image on 10th June 1931;
however, U Saw republished these images in The Burmese Situation.142

Fear that the employment of Indian troops would facilitate additional
tension between the Bamar and Indians was not limited to the Burmese press.
British anti-imperialist newspapers, although biased, foreshadowed the
indiscriminate violence against Indians which would define late-colonial Burma.
The Daily Worker wrote, “the Government is endeavoring to give this revolt
against British imperialism an ‘anti-Indian’ turn, both by employing Indian troops
against the Burmese and by encouraging the importation of Indian labourers, who
141
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are ready to accept even lower wages than the Burmese.”143 This passage
illustrates that British actions were the cause of the increasing virulence of antiIndian sentiment in Burma. Moreover, a British newspaper publishing this
account meant that these inter-ethnic tensions were common knowledge and that
efforts could have been made to alleviate them. Instead, the Government’s
continued use of force provided the Bamar with indisputable evidence of their
oppression, strong enough for the international press to recognize. The phrasing
“to give this revolt an anti-Indian turn” suggests that before the use of Indian
troops the rebellion had not been anti-Indian in general. During the Burma
Legislative Assembly Debates of September 22, 1931, F. B. Leach states, “I do
not think that that amounts to saying that the anti-Indian movement was part of
the rebellion.” This is in reference to accounts of rebels looting “the homes of
isolated Indian cultivators in the fields.”144 Leach introduces the idea that the Saya
San Rebellion was not inherently anti-Indian, but that anti-Indian sentiment
developed over time. However, the images of beheaded rebels allowed Bamar
nationalists such as U Saw to use any non-Bamar, but Indians in particular, as
scapegoats for British-directed military action.
Where there had previously been a divide in the opinions of urban Bamar
nationalists and rural peasants regarding the status of Indians in the Burmese
plural society, the Saya San Rebellion united urban and rural Bamar peoples
under the idea of “Burma should be for the Burmans Alone.” For the urban
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Bamar, anti-Indian sentiment had existed to some degree because cities such as
Rangoon were ports where Indian immigrants could immediately settle and form
visible communities. H. F. Searle described how “[t]he frequent cry that the
Indian is replacing the Burman is due to the large number of Indians that can be
seen landing from the ships [in Rangoon]...[and that] the Indian population is
[too] concentrated.”145 This is in contrast to the rural situation at the beginning of
the Saya San Rebellion where the British, village headmen, and Chettiar
moneylenders represented the initial targets while Indian farmers were not singled
out. However, the British use of Indian troops enraged the rural Bama peasantry
to such a degree that they now possessed the same anti-Indian beliefs as the urban
nationalists, expressing this anger by burning down Indian inhabited residences.
The Saya San Rebellion gave both urban Bamar nationalists and rural Bamar
peasants the chance to falsely implicate all Indians in Burma for the crimes of a
minority of British Indian Army soldiers.

Conclusions
The Saya San Rebellion sowed the seeds of Bamar ethnonationalism
which bridged the gap between urban and rural Bamar residents under the guise
of anti-Indian sentiment. Saya San’s movement helped develop a Burmese
identity through illustrating to all that being a member of an independent Burmese
community meant subscribing to a civic identity, consisting of resisting the
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British and co-colonialists, which was upheld by an ethnic identity of being
Bamar. The violent suppression of the Rebellion showed that a violent uprising
against the British would be impossible to win for the time being. It did not matter
how fanatical the rebel forces were, charging British battalions would never
amount to victory. The fight for independence would no longer be on the
battlefield but in the halls of the legislature. But in contrast to traditional
interpretations of nationalism in Burma emerging from western educated elites,
peasants laid the foundations of the Burmese civic and Bamar ethnic nationalism
through their establishment of an “in-group” consisting of Bamar Buddhists, and
an out-group of co-colonialists. The Saya San Rebellion unified both urban and
rural Bamar residents under the idea that the oppression by co-colonialists,
especially Indians, could be ameliorated through a violent purge of the British
colonial system and its co-colonialist agents.
The use of Buddhist and Bamar animist symbols had been effective for
Saya San but within a legislature under British supervision, millenarism had its
limitations. Instead, the anti-Indian sentiment which had become a key trait of the
late stages of the Saya San Rebellion would serve as a more radical tool for
gaining widespread attention. As we have seen, a hatred towards Indian troops
was espoused by the majority Bamar population. Bigotry against Indians was an
established sentiment for many Bamar at the end of the Rebellion, there was
nothing stopping legislators such as U Saw and U Pu from demonizing Indians as
members of a fifth column. With the British ready to provide measures of self-
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government to the populations of Burma and India in the 1930s, the scene was set
for the next step towards Burmese independence – “the Separation Crisis.”
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CHAPTER THREE
To Divide or Not to Divide: The Emergence of Bamar Ethnonationalism,
Anti-Indian Sentiment, and the Nation During the “Separation Crisis”
The term “Separation Crisis” defines the late-nineteenth century political
debate over whether Burma should separate from India to become its own colony
within the British Empire. Discussions that began in the halls of the legislature
trickled down into the general populace, both urban and rural, as political factions
for and against separation campaigned extensively to win a legislative majority.
To understand how this “crisis” came about, it is important to trace the evolution
of the legislative system in Burma under British rule, starting at the end of the
Third Anglo-Burmese War.
The year was 1885 and British soldiers with bayonets forced the last king
of Burma, Thibaw Min, to abdicate his throne and live a life in exile, concluding
the Third Anglo-Burmese War. The King and royal court officials boarded a
steamship bound for India whilst crowds lined the streets to bid farewell to their
monarch.146 Royalist support did not disintegrate immediately as royal court
officials, soldiers, and the Sangha, all dependent on the patronage of the king,
rose in open revolt between 1886 and 1890.147 It took over four years for the
British to “pacify” Upper Burma and bring the province under a nominal “peace.”
The British administration stripped Burma of its sovereignty and made it a
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province of the larger British Indian Empire. Viewing Burma as an appendage of
the Indian subcontinent––separating its connection to Southeast Asia––the British
implemented an administrative system mirroring that which governed India.
There was a reliance on direct administration, “down to the district level,” by
British officials. The militaristic chain of command was the antithesis of
traditional Southeast Asian modes of administration governed by patron-client
relationships.148 Reciprocity, a characteristic of these patron-client relations,
disappeared when royal officials were turned transformed into civil servants.
British direct rule foreshadowed the immense number of roadblocks on the road
to indigenous rule in Burma.149
1897 was a significant year for Burma as the first steps towards
indigenous participation in government came in the form of the Legislative
Council of Burma. The Legislative Council initially consisted of “four officials
and five nominated non-officials” who served as an advisory group to the
Lieutenant Governor of Burma.150 The British did not offer this policy out of
empathy but rather to “improve” economic productivity in the province, as these
appointed officials included representatives from different corporations looking to
maximize the wealth extraction from the colony.151 Prior to 1897, there was no
official outlet for the concerns of people with interests in Burma, including the
wealthy. Previously, laws governing Burma were officially ratified in India in a
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system where bills drafted by the Burmese administration had to be approved by
the Legislative Council of India and the Governor-General-in-Council.152 With
many of the civil servants in the Burmese administration having received their
training in India, British officials made laws for the Bamar majority based on
legislation already implemented in India. Although the Council was a mere
gesture to British rulers, it nonetheless established an important basis for later
self-governing efforts by illustrating that British authority could be challenged.
“The Separation Crisis” began with the British restricting self-governing
institutions to India-proper, leaving Burma under direct rule.153 By 1917 the
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Samuel Montagu, declared that British policy
in India would be that of “the gradual development of self-governing institutions
with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India.”154
The proposed “Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms” were realized in the 1919
Government of India Act which introduced a dyarchy system of government to
India. Under the dyarchy system, the Crown appointed officials governed
alongside elected ministers within the executive branch. A step towards selfgovernance, certain government departments such as agriculture, health, and
education would be under the purview of Indian ministers who were themselves
subject to regulation from local legislative councils.155 However, the Government
of India Act did not initially extend to the Province of Burma due to the British
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administration in India believing that “Burma is not India, its people belong to
another race in another stage of political development.”156
While Burma was indeed not India, the notion that the Burmese were not
developed enough to receive self-governing institutions was an absurd and
inflammatory notion. Decades of British governance dictated by the belief that
Burma could be governed in the same manner as India exacerbated Burmese
feelings of being treated as second-class citizens when dyarchy was not extended
to them. In Rangoon, “Indians found it easier than Burmese to dominate middle
and lower echelon commercial and government positions,” and reforms restricted
to India-proper strengthened a Bamar belief that they would continue to be treated
as inferior to Indians.157
Protest against the limitations of the Government of India Act was the start
of a modern Burmese nationalist movement. Students at the University of
Rangoon, pongyis, and the newly formed GCBA called for an extension of selfgoverning institutions to Burma through both non-violent and violent protest.158
While the Saya San Rebellion of the 1930s aimed to restore a pre-colonial order,
there was hope that these initial demonstrations represented a Burmese
nationalism that aimed to create a society where indigenous and Western elements
could coexist. Taking inspiration from the Indian Congress Party, Burmese
leaders worked with the Indian Congress Party to boycott the first reformed
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legislature election of October 1920 in India – this cooperation would not stand
the test of time as anti-Indian sentiment grew during the “Separation Crisis.”159
The unity between Bamar and Indian nationalists in the 1920s proved its
fruitfulness when passive resistance inspired by Gandhi resulted in the
Government of Burma Act of 1921. Dyarchy was thereby extended to Burma and
in 1923 the British reformed the Legislative Council of Burma to include 103
members, of which 80 members were elected.160 However, the dyarchy system
was immediately scorned by the majority of the Bamar political activists because
dyarchy gave them nominal control over certain ministries with the most powerful
positions reserved for Crown-appointed officials.161 The Government of India Act
stipulated a review of reformed government institutions within 10 years through
the Indian Statutory Commission, or Simon Commission, led by Sir John Simon.
This commission surveyed the efficacy of British rule in India-proper and Burma
in 1927 and 1929, respectively.162 As shown in Chapter Two, the Bamar
peasantry held great animosity towards Chettiar moneylenders and perceived
Indian immigration into cities such as Rangoon to be competing with Burmese
labor. The socio-political climate of Burma in 1929 had drastically changed since
1921 as land continued to fall from the peasantry into the hands of moneylenders
and landlords. Unexpectedly, the Simon Commission advocated for the separation
of India and Burma into two distinct colonies with independent governments due
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to the aforementioned issues, writing that “Burma’s political subservience to India
has seriously jeopardized her financial and economic interests and even threatens
to denationalize her.”163 However, this action was not out of empathy but the
understanding that inaction would have most likely resulted in civil unrest in
response to problems the British themselves created.
The process of separation, organized through two London roundtable
conferences undertaken while the Saya San Rebellion raged, resulted in the
solidification of “Separationist” and “anti-Separationist” coalitions. The first
roundtable conference occurred in 1930 and the second in 1931.164 The second
conference, aptly named the Burma Round Table Conference did not produce the
desired result of unanimous support for the separation of Burma from India.165 As
a result, the British Prime Minister demanded “a clear mandate from the Burmese
people as to their desires in the matter.”166 The decision for separation or
federation with India could now be controlled to an extent by the Burma
Legislative Council. Rather quickly, two political alliances dubbed the
“Separationists” and “anti-Separationists” formed.
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The divisions between the Separationists and anti-Separationists became a
bitter political feud and illustrated that different philosophies existed within
Burmese nationalism. Historian Matthew Bowser characterizes the platform of the
Separationists as consisting “mainly of anti-Indian prejudice, encouraging popular
hostility towards Indian laborers and moneylenders and accusing the antiSeparationists of being Indian patsies.”167 As we shall see, this is an accurate
representation of the Separationist’s views which eventually dictated the
“imagined community” of an independent Burmese state. The political sentiment
that evolved into anti-Indian prejudice, however, originated in response to real
issues of land tenure and competition for urban jobs with Indian immigrants. The
anti-Separationists built their case on the feelings of distrust towards the British
during the earlier Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, where a legislature was only
extended to Burma after significant protest.168 Anti-Separationists feared that
Burma’s separation from India would place Burma under a stricter British
administration when compared to India and they had the suppression of the Saya
San Rebellion to show how oppressive the British could be. While both alliances
sought independence, they differed in how they approached achieving this goal.
The anti-Separationists believed that working with Indian nationalists would be
advantageous in securing the independence of both India and Burma whilst the
Separationists viewed “Indian immigration in this modern age is a danger to the
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Burmese nationality.”169 However, I will show that this dichotomous description
of the alliances in the “Separation Crisis” is an oversimplification, and that antiIndian sentiment specifically would emerge in both parties.
Bamar Separationists perceived the findings of the Simon Commission
and the following roundtable conferences Commission as windows to Burmese
independence that prompted the question of “who belongs” in an independent
Burma. While the anti-Separationists initially rejected the Simon Commission’s
findings wholeheartedly, the debate over separation in the legislature provided
them an opportunity as well to shape a Burmese identity as well. The Simon
Commission developed the idea of the modern Burmese nation by centering
discussion of the shared linguistic, religious, and national characteristics of the
Bamar to take center stage in legislative debate. There was always a concept of a
Bamar homeland, but this took the form of the Buddhist kingdoms in Upper
Burma where the idea of citizenship was sidelined in favor of Buddhist identity.
The Simon Commission expressed the idea that “[British India] is not an
association of two peoples [Indians and Burmans] having natural affinities
tending towards union.”170
Bamar nationalists regardless of Separationist or anti-Separationist
allegiance, now had in writing, a justification to claim the land within Burma’s
borders as Bamar land. The idea that the Bamar were different from Indians in all
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respects, which was the philosophical backbone of separation, foreshadowed that
the Burmese nation would be formed through the strengthening of Bamar racial
identity and the exclusion of peoples. Bamar Separationists embraced British
racism to legitimate their claims that Burma’s land should belong to them. I argue
that Bamar nationalists used the aftermath of the Simon Commission as a chance
to imagine a nation governed by the Bamar “race” and religion. The issues of land
tenure and Indian immigration which fueled the concurrent Saya San Rebellion
meant that the Burmese nation had its beginning in an environment hostile to
minorities.
Benedict Anderson’s idea of a nation as “an imagined political
community– and imagined both inherently limited and sovereign” provides a
useful definition to understand why the Separationists would emphasize Bamar
race, religion, and geography in their vision for Burma. 171 The process of
separating Burma from India provided a platform for Bamar ethnic nationalism to
grow at the expense of the Indian minority. The rhetoric of the “plural society”
would be supplanted by an imagined national community defined as distinctly
“anti-Indian.” Rather than explicitly rallying the urbanites to the banner of ethnic
nationalism, Bamar nationalist leaders would instead characterize the Indian
community as an expanding entity that would replace the Bamar. Thus the
“Separation Crisis,” concurrent with the Saya San Rebellion, provided the
foundation for a modern Burmese nation by constructing a community based on
exclusivity rather than inclusivity. In contrast to the Saya San Rebellion, the goals
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of Bamar Separationist and anti-Separationist legislators was to form a modern
Burmese nation, for the Bamar, based on egalitarian values. While Saya San’s
followers who desired a return to a pre-colonial Buddhist kingdom, the urban
Bamar leaders of the “Separation Crisis” used modern nationalist rhetoric of
country and race to fight for home-rule. Rather than expressing their desire for
self-rule using arms, urban Bamar residents would fight in the halls of the
legislature to build a modern Burmese state with a clear sense of national identity
and citizenship.

Separation and the Racialization of the Bamar
By stating that “Burma is not India” and therefore that the Burmese were
not Indian, the Simon Commission made highlighting ethnic differences the first
step to imagining who belongs in an independent Burma. Rather than promoting
civic ideals to which the Burmese state and its potential citizens could aspire,
ethnic nationalism proved to be the easier way to unite the Bamar majority against
their British and perceived Indian oppressors. The Bamar during the pre-colonial,
colonial, and post-colonial periods shared “a sense of commonality based on a
myth of common origins … a common language, and common customs” which
Eric Weitz uses to define the term “ethnic group.”172 As shown in Chapters One
and Two, this commonality came from a proud history of Bamar Buddhist
kingdoms, Theravada Buddhism itself, belief in Nat spirits, the custom of
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tattooing, and the Burmese language. However, the British not only differentiated
Indian and Bamar peoples as separate races but also categorized the Bamar and
other indigenous peoples of Burma as separate races, arbitrarily writing that
“[w]hereas the Karen is naturally truthful (perhaps because he is slow-witted), the
Burman is a confirmed boaster. The Burman is a delightful and amusing
companion, but he is volatile, unstable, incompetent, with sudden enthusiasm and
passions, never long sustained.”173 The British created these false “traits” to
divide and rule and this perception that the ethnic groups of Burma each
possessed unique transgenerational behaviors constituted a British constructed
difference.
Racialization served as an effective tool for the Separationists to unite the
Bamar to construct a national identity based on their differences from other ethnic
groups residing in Burma. Weitz writes:
Ethnic groups develop into nations when they become politicized and
strive to create, or have created for them, a political order—the nationstate—whose institutions are seen to conform in some way to their ethnic
identity, and whose boundaries are, ideally, contiguous with the group’s
territoriality.174
The “Separation Crisis” provided Bamar nationalists with a platform to define
themselves as the rightful heirs of the land within British Burma’s boundaries and
to develop a political order based on British-defined racial differences from the
peoples local to the outskirts of Burma. Separation from India hardened a notion
of ethnic difference along colonial borders, thus emphasizing the Bamar as race,
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“the most exclusive form of identity,” and provided an argument for Bamar rule
in Burma.175 British notions of race strengthened the idea of ethnic distinctiveness
during the “Separation Crisis.” Thus, Bamar nationalists relinquished nuanced
ideologies, such as the ideas of anti-separation and separation, in favor of a
monolithic ideology of “Burma for the Burmans,” which would manifest itself
during the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots.
To Bamar Separationists, association with the land of Burma became a
key prerequisite to Burmese citizenship and a way to define “outsiders.” The
debate over separation disseminated the conception that the land of Burma was
different from India proper, and Bamar Separationists used this idea to define the
people originally from these respective lands as different and therefore alien to
each other. To the Separationists, immigrants needed to prove their loyalty to
Burma to even have a chance of being a member of the community.
One of the agents within the broader Separationist movement was the Burma
for the Burmans League, who published their “definition of a Burman,” in a
resolution to the Simon Commission including a draft constitution for a separated
Burma. The Burma for the Burmans League was a nationalist organization which
well within the broader political group of the Separationist League.176 This draft
constitution was published in 1929 to show the members of the Simon
Commission that Burma was ready for self-governance and included citizenship
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requirements such as proving long-term settlement and a connection to Burma
both geographically and civically. A “Burman” was defined as:
1. A person of any race born and brought up on the soil of Burma and who
continues to make Burma his or her home for good, without any
distinction of caste, class, colour, or creed
2. A person of any race born outside of Burma but who comes to Burma,
lives in Burma for not less than 25 years, knows Burmese well and claims
Burmese citizenship with the intention of making Burma his or her home
for good. All others not coming within these two categories are necessarily
non-Burmans, and must be treated as aliens and foreigners coming to
Burma for temporary purposes only.177
The first part of the definition reflects the importance of ties to the geographic
territory of Burma for membership in the “imagined community.” This proposed
policy of jus soli (“citizenship by soil”) overrides distinction based on both
inherited and cultural traits such as skin color and creed, respectively. The idea of
birthright citizenship illustrates that this nationalist movement, emerging out of
the separation debate, wanted to develop a Burmese nation with intangible
requirements for citizenship whereas such requirements in writing were not
advantageous in a pre-colonial kingdom. Characterizing what makes a citizen
strengthened national identity because defining an “in-group” creates an opposing
“out-group.”
While the idea of Burmese citizen birthright may convey an emphasis on
civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism, the requirement of living in Burma for
at least 25 years and mastering the Burmese language illustrates that the idea of
being Burmese was tied to the Bamar language, customs, and the soil of Burma.
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Despite this definition of a “Burman” appearing to accommodate immigrants into
a Burmese imagined community, learning Burmese, the language of the Bamar,
provides the Bamar with an advantage in securing a place in the community
signaling to ethnic minorities that they were second-class citizens. The use of the
terms “aliens and foreigners” outright establishes an “in-group” and “out-group”
based on geography and ethnicity. Definitions of membership in the Burmese
nation would move towards the idea of jus sanguinis (“citizenship by blood”)
foreshadowing a growing hostility towards immigrants.
It is important to understand that this Burmese draft constitution was
written with the intention of being read by the British as well as the general
population, potentially dampening its nationalistic tone. Including divisive
statements such as an outright cry for restrictions on immigration would carry an
aura of ethnonationalism that threatened British rule; therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the rhetoric found in this definition was a mild version of the true
feelings of the Burma for the Burmans League. The name Burma for the Burmans
illustrates their goal of forming a Bamar-dominated state, as the terms Burman
and Bamar was synonymous in the colonial period. As we shall see, the
Separationists were the epitome of an ethnonationalist party.
The Separationists’ definition of a “Burman” captures the importance of
geographic ties to Burma and illustrates that Burmese nationalism would
increasingly take the form of Bamar nationalism. Bamar nationalist U Mya U
wrote in the Rangoon Times that:
We Burmans have, as a race, had our own kings before the advent of the
British, continuously for more than 1,000 years and are proud of our own
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race as every nation has its racial pride...we have one race (Burman), one
language (Burmese), one religion (Buddhism), one ideal, and one dress
without any caste or caste distinction, while our manners and customs
have remained free of diversity.178
U Mya U uses Burman as a synonym for the Bamar, characterizing the latter as
“race.” The author places the terms “Burman,” “Burmese,” and “Buddhism” in
succession to argue that these three items collectively define Burmese identity and
are thus indivisible. By sandwiching this definition of Burmese identity between a
glorification of Bamar kings and customs that have remained “free of diversity,”
the author argues that Bamar and Burmese identity are equivalent. U Mya U
attempts to convince the urban reader not only that the Bamar have the right to
govern due to their historical ties with the land but also that this right should be
inheritable and passed down to the next generation of Bamar offspring. U Mya U
emphasizes the continuity and purity of Bamar identity by praising a lack of
diversity in “manners and customs.” The idea that the imagined community
should conform to Bamar identity and not vice versa builds on the notion that
Burma was to be a country for the Bamar. A Separationist, U Mya U directs his
article towards the urban elite with the goal of fostering a Bamar racial identity
and how that identity will disappear under the current dyarchy system. Imagining
the Bamar as the proud historic rulers of Burma contends that only they have the
precedent and the continued mandate to rule Burma. U Mya U’s newspaper article
illustrates how the “Separation Crisis” drove Bamar ethno-nationalism to new
extremes under the hope that a Bamar-dominated nation-state was possible.
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The ethnonationalism and racialization of the Bamar was not inevitable
but rather a conscious choice of nationalists who saw this rhetoric as useful in
their arguments for separation and eventual independence. While we have
established that the Bamar ethnic group had a proud history prior to British rule,
the notion of the Bamar as a “race” and its role in creating an imagined national
community was based on concepts from the “Western world from around 1700
onward.”179 What defines the emerging rhetoric that the Bamar were a race was a
hierarchical construction of difference, inherent to racialization, and the notion
that the Bamar race could be “defiled.”180
The fear of “impurities” in the Bamar race drove U Mya U to advocate for
a Burma “free of diversity.” U Mya U actively refuted both the plural society as
well as the possibility of creating a Burmese identity inclusive to minorities using
British racial rhetoric. Furthermore, U Mya U warns his audience that “[s]ince our
annexation there has been an inrush of non-Burmese races into our land. Out of a
population of 13 million people, there are 3 million foreign races, that is, 2.5
million Indians and 0.5 a million of all other races.”181 U Mya U argues that
Burma belongs to the Bamar and that his audience should be afraid of an ongoing
“invasion” by “non-Burmese races.” By labeling an in-group consisting of the
Bamar and an out-group “foreign races,” U Mya U constructs a hierarchy where
the Bamar have the greatest claim to the land and membership in the community.
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These statements appearing in a well-circulated government paper such as the
Rangoon Times not only reflect an attempt to convince the British that separation
needed to occur immediately but also an intent to spread Bamar ethnonationalist
rhetoric during the process of separation. The author used the debate over
separation to argue that foreigners threatened the Bamar inheritance of Burma
borders thus the “Separation Crisis” fueled the mentality that a plural society
could not stand.
The emerging idea of “racial purity,” a product of the “Separation Crisis,”
bolstered the notion that the Bamar as a race possessed the birthright to live in and
govern an independent Burma. Separationists and the general population either
disseminated or were aware of an emerging hierarchy in which immigrants,
especially those from India, were perceived as having less of a claim than the
Bamar to live in Burma. This is a rejection of the British imposed ethnic hierarchy
part of divide and rule policies where Indians and indigenous minorities in Burma
had greater authority than the Bamar. Thus, the Bamar claim to Burma became
more radical through the perception that both the Bamar and nation would
become “impure” because of co-colonialist ethnic minorities. In reference to
Indian immigrants, U Mya U wrote:
Of this 3 million, let us assume that 2 million have been absorbed in the
Burmese nation by marriage lawfully or otherwise with Burmese Buddhist
women. The issues of such a union could not be ipso facto be pure
Burmese, and the religious faith of such children would be non-Buddhist,
as children generally follow the religion of their fathers.182
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The claim that immigrants needed to assimilate into the Burmese nation through
marriage with Burmese Buddhist women illustrates the transformation of Bamar
identity from one based on customs to one based on progeny. U Mya U suggests
that having a child with a Bamar Buddhist women should be a requirement for
immigrants to become a member of the community, illustrating that membership
in the imagined community would be based on the amount of Bamar “blood.”
However, not all Bamar nationalists wanted immigrants to marry Bamar Buddhist
women because they “feared Indians producing half-caste children (called
zerbadis in the case of Muslim marriages) who would dilute out the ‘pure’
Burmese race over a period of time.”183 What unites the Bamar nationalists’
opposing arguments is the emphasis on the importance of offspring, the future of
the nation, and the maintenance of Bamar racial “purity.” The idea that Bamar
blood was required to be a member of the community, in both cases, conveys the
Bamar nationalists’ intentional use of racializing rhetoric to create a new Burmese
identity. Race and racial purity served Bamar nationalists well as they contributed
to building a racial hierarchy, with the Bamar at the top, providing a criterion for
membership in their imagined community.
The engineering of an existential threat towards the survival of the Bamar
race and its potential “extermination” reflects the Separationist racialization of the
Bamar to argue that to be Burmese is to be Bamar. Referring back to U Mya U’s
article, he writes "the very existence of the Burmans as a race would be
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threatened, choked and finally meet with extermination in the course of a few
decades."184 Words such as “choked” and “extermination” are a direct emotional
appeal to the Bamar reader with the goal of sewing a feeling of insecurity. The
urban reader becomes a stakeholder in the “Separation Crisis” because the article
is inviting them to join the Bamar nationalist cause. By portraying the Bamar as
under threat with an emphasis on future progeny and survival, the writer portrays
the Bamar as a group that must band together to survive. This defensive
racializing rhetoric illustrates that the “Separation Crisis” provided a platform for
Bamar Separationists to convince their comrades to battle for separation. The
thought of extermination of one’s race is the ultimate motivator to act and fight;
therefore, we can interpret U Mya U’s article as a direct plea to exclude the nonBamar using the threat of “race extinction.”
It is also important to consider that the increasing popularity of the idea of
a Burma for the Bamar was noted by the British, illustrating that they felt the
colonial apparatus could be threatened by this rhetoric. While the colonial power
certainly has a bias against their subjects taking up ethnonationalism, the British
also had a vested interest in reporting the development of such sentiment. Oscar
de Glanville, a British member and later president of the Legislative Council of
Burma, wrote the following in 1929:
Burman opinion has taken up the cry of Burma for the Burmans and
desires to exclude Indians, Chinese, and foreigners that mean European
British subjects. Their desire is to exclude everyone who is not a Burman
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Buddhist from Government service and if given a free hand would oppress
them in every way.185
From this account, we see the extent to which Bamar ethnonationalism began to
gain notoriety within government circles and its increasing role in dictating the
vision of the Burmese nation. Despite Oscar de Glanville hailing from Britain, his
writings provide a good glimpse into the sentiments of Bamar nationalists due to
his position as a member of the legislature. The references to the goal of the
exclusion of all non-Bamar from Burma illustrate that from 1929 the Bamar urban
population, and especially the Separationists, imagined their community to be
comprised of and ruled by ethnic Bamar peoples. Separationist leader U Ba Pe
said that “to achieve the aim that Burma is for Burmans with a Burmese
Government and to re-hoist the standard of our Burmese Peacock it is not possible
to rely on any other nation."186 U Ba Pe’s statement from 1932 suggests that the
ethnonationalist rhetoric discussed continued to grow into the 1930s moving
towards a goal of a modern Burmese nation for the Bamar. Self-reliance and a
reference to the symbol of the Kombaung Dynasty, the peacock, represents an
attempt to develop a new state ideology while using established symbols to unite
the population. The desire for a Burman-run government reflects de Glanville’s
analysis that an independent Burmese government would be run by Bamar
representatives.
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The Separationists’ racial characterization of the Bamar people as a race
was to unify the Bamar for Burma’s separation from India, while the success of
this rhetoric came at the expense of the non-Bamar. The “Separation Crisis” is
unique because Separationists used it to strengthen Bamar ethnonationalism,
through racialization, which had effects in the years to come. The belief that
foreign “races” were an invading force that would exterminate the Bamar race
persisted beyond the “Separation Crisis” (Fig. 3). The enemy would not only be
Indians but also the Chinese and Shans, an ethnic minority historically from the
border between Burma and Thailand. An extension of who does not belong in
Burma highlights how the construction of the Bamar as a race bolstered the notion
that the Bamar were the only in-group in Burma. The caricatures of Chinese and
Shans intently charging into Burma were deliberate. Such drawings demonized
minorities as intentionally driving the Bamar to the sea towards extermination.
Such strong connotations of the threat to Bamar survival illustrate the
Separationist success in constructing the Bamar as a race under threat from
enemies all over. The degree that this inflammatory rhetoric radicalized the
Bamar population can be seen by the anti-Separationist leader and future Prime
Minister of Burma Baw Maw’s comment that “[w]e were the people who went all
over the country during the last elections, that race hatred spread throughout the
entire country like a fire. That fire it seems still exists."187 Not only was the
manufactured conception of the Bamar as a race popular, but it also remained
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present in the lives of the Bamar throughout the country. Baw Maw’s concern
illustrates the severity of the racialization of the Bamar and how not all Bamar
nationalists subscribed to this tactic as the most stabilizing force in the fight for
independence. The racialization of the Bamar was a deliberate act, fueled by the
desire for independence, executed using the issue of separation of Burma from
India, and an act that would proliferate the belief of a “Burma for the Burmans.”

Figure 3: Cartoon, “Pressed by the Chinese and Pushed out by the Shans.” The cartoon depicts
caricatures of Chinese and Shan peoples driving the Burmese to the sea. This cartoon was
reprinted in The Immigration Problem of Burma by U Thein Maung which itself was published in
1939.188
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Bamar Ethnonationalism and Anti-Indian Sentiment
The British failure to fix underlying land tenure issues and competition for
labor between Indians and Bamar peoples increased the appeal of
ethnonationalism. It is telling that the anti-Indian rhetoric espoused at Burma
Legislative Council Proceedings coincided with the rural Saya San Rebellion.
Urban Bamar legislators and rural peasants, despite the differences in their visions
for Burma, both viewed Indians as co-colonialists and thus opponents of their
respective ideas of a Burmese imagined community. In essence, both reactions to
British benightedness were movements aimed at restoring the Bamar race to a
pre-colonial “glory” by expelling Indians from Burma. However, the evolution of
Bamar to become synonymous with Burmese over the course of the “Separation
Crisis” began with an emphasis on shared language and culture. The membership
criteria for the Burma for the Burmans League illustrated the importance of the
Burmese language, writing:
it was decided that membership be open to all Burmans of both sexes:
those born in Burma and are able to read and write Burmese; those not
born in Burma but are able to read and write Burmese and have decided to
settle down in Burma for life and acquire Burmese Domicile.189
The criteria that members had to know Burmese, the language of the Bamar,
reflects the intrinsically Bamar nature of the imagined Burmese state. Language is
central to the identity of a people and nation; therefore, excluding the non-Bamar
began the building of a nation that was both “limited and sovereign.” While
Burmese literacy served as a convenient criterion for excluding non-Bamar, it still
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provided an avenue for foreigners to join the League so long as they took the time
to learn. In the Draft Constitution of the Free State of Burma, submitted by the
Separation League in 1929, “[t]he national language of the FREE STATE is the
Burmese Language, but the English language shall be equally recognized as an
official language.”190 We see that the Burma for Burmans League, which formed
the bulk of the Separationist camp, was also an urban elite organization as it
valued Burmese and English literacy, traits unique to the elite. However, making
Burmese and English the official language of the nation caters specifically to the
Bamar majority, and their temporary foreign allies. In contrast to the peasantry
who led the Saya San Rebellion, the League favored the educated and would fight
for a Burma for the Burmans through litigation.
While the Burma for Burmans League had an urban and educated
membership, they needed the support of the masses and the success of Bamar
ethnonationalism required the creation of an out-group. By 1929 anti-Chettiar
sentiment was common enough amongst the Bamar that race-baiting would
become the tool of the Separationist to unite the Bamar as the in-group of an
independent nation. In 1929, the Burma for the Burmans League submitted the
following statement to the Simon Commission presenting the reasons for
separation:
Burma may therefore be likened to a milch cow and the Central Board of
Revenue in India to a clever Indian milkman. For several years past, the
Indian milkman milked Rs. 1000 lakhs worth of milk from the Burma
milch cow, and fed his wife and children, the Indian people.191
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The Separationists attempt to convince the British that the Bamar were being
robbed, not by the British but by Indians, using the racist trope that minority
populations leech off of the benevolent and naïve majority. There is no specificity
in the statement, the Burma for the Burmans League dehumanizes all Indians,
even those in India proper, as active participants in the “milking” of Burma for its
resources at the expense of the Bamar. The phrases “clever” sews the idea that the
minority was purposefully deceitful, and that the plural society could not survive.
Such rhetoric inculcates that only the Bamar or Indians could inhabit the land
within the borders of British Burma.
To the Separationists, the existence of an Indian minority in Burma not
only represented an economic threat but also a threat to the “purity” of Bamar
blood. We have seen that Western ideas of race by blood quantum served as a
useful tool for some Bamar nationalists to espouse the idea that the Bamar are tied
by blood to the land; therefore, their imagined community would be a
homogenous one. However, the Bamar defined composition of an out-group
would evolve from those who were non-Bamar to specifically target Indians over
the course of the “Separation Crisis.” Saya Myo, President of the Burma for
Burmans Separation League, discussed “five kinds of destruction” which
challenged the Bamar race. The most important one was how:
Consequently, the proportion of Indians to the sons of the soil, being
twenty to one, they have to jostle with each other, impairing the purity of
the indigenous race. The danger of race extinction is thus upon us and the
statement that the Burmese, as a nation, would soon disappear are true.192
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Saya Myo establishes his imagined community, that the “soil” of the Burmese
nation belonged to the indigenous races and not to Indians. The notion of
“extinction” of the indigenous race suggest that Indians form a present and future
threat to the survival of the Bamar. This erroneous claim illustrates that antiIndian sentiment formed the Separationists’ ethnic nationalist platform. A fear of
uninhibited Indian immigration and economic exploitation led to this anti-Indian
sentiment becoming prominent “at all levels of the plural society” during the late
1920s and early 1930s, especially due to such rhetoric appearing in vernacular
newspapers and pamphlets.193
The notion of “indigenous” races can be expanded to tribes such as the
Karen who fall within the borders of British Burma; however, Indians are
specifically excluded illustrating the hostility of the Bamar towards Indians based
on race. The Separationist League’s Draft Constitution supports that “a certain
number of seats should be reserved for the Karens or at least such arrangements
should be made as to ensure them a certain number of seats.”194 Through
extending representation to the Karen people, the Separationists made the Karen
stakeholders in their vision for Burma. This statement from a 1929 memorandum
suggests that in the immediate aftermath of the Simon Commission’s report, a
subset of Bamar nationalists restricted membership to their Burmese community
to those who used the Burmese language, English, and were from within British
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Burma’s borders. This represents a broad definition of being Burmese, as it
included ethnic minorities, but was purposefully anti-Indian; the Bamar
Separationists invited both the Karen National Association and British Burman
Association to discuss the draft constitution for a separated Burma on December
12th, 1928.195 We see that the Separationist’s definition of Burmese excludes
coolie laborers from India, who were not afforded the opportunity to learn
Burmese and worked meager wages to support relatives in India.196 Wealthy
Indians, such as Chettiars, are also excluded as seen by the example of the “milch
cow.” The first year of the “Separation Crisis” illustrates that to the Bamar
Separationists, Indians broadly represented a foreign element that was leeching
off the indigenous peoples of Burma. We see the inclusion of the Karen people,
perceived as co-colonialists by the rural Saya San Rebels, in the Separationists’
meetings illustrating that the urban Bamar Separationists viewed the Indian
minority as the greatest threat to a Burmese and now Bamar idealized community.
To the Separationists to be Burmese was to be anti-Indian.
The specificity of the Separationists’ actions towards building a Burma
with a political and social climate inhospitable for Indians can be seen by an
initial willingness to push for separation alongside the Karen National
Association.197 In 1929, the Karen National Association (KNA) sent a
memorandum to the Simon Commission detailing their desire for a self-governing
Karen state under the guise of supporting separation with a stipulation that Burma
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would include a federated Karen state nominally part of Burma. The Karen
National Association wrote, “if then Burma deserves Home Rule, does not
Independence deserve, all the more Independence?”198 San C. Po, a prominent
Karen nationalist, and member of the Legislative Council, advocated for Burma’s
separation from India because that would be a prerequisite for a Karen state
“under the able guiding hands of sympathetic and efficient British officers.”199
The KNA’s support of the Separation League was not due to its belief in Bamar
ethnonationalism or have any desires to be a part of a Bamar-dominated state. In
fact, the opposite was true and the KNA sided with the Separation League for the
sole purpose of advancing their desire to maintain a distinction between
themselves and the Bamar. The expression of Karen ethnic independence through
the means of a separate state suggests that the Separation League’s vision was for
a Burma for the Bamar people, thus forcing the Karen to advocate for their own
political independence. However, at the Burma Round Table Conference of 1931,
the Separationist camp was divided as to the demands of the Karen with U Ba Pe
arguing that “the Karens were not a distinct racial group” and therefore should not
be entitled to their own state.200 The Karen had their own identities thus U Ba Pe’s
statement does not reflect a welcoming of the Karen into a Bamar Buddhist
imagined community but rather one of forced assimilation. From the Burmese
language requirements for membership, found in the Constitution of the Burma
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Free State, we see that only through a complete shedding of the cultural
characteristics that make a person Karen, could a Karen person join this proposed
Burma Free State. Thus, the Separationists used KNA political support but
imaged their Burma as a Bamar Buddhist society and some members would be
willing to make an erasure of Karen identity as a prerequisite for Karen
membership in this imagined community.
Another emerging debate during the “Separation Crisis” was that of the
marriage between Indian men, especially Muslims, and Burmese Buddhist
women. Children of mixed ethnicity in this case were called zerbadees and their
parents faced scrutiny by many urban Bamar.201 The idea that Bamar “racial
purity” would be disturbed through inter-ethnic marriage was particularly antiIndian. The Separation League wrote in 1929 that "antiquated Indian marriage
laws and customs are now in force to the prejudice of Burmese women and their
offspring. Communalism with all its evils is taking root in Burma."202 This
argument against Indian marriage laws and marriage between Burmese women
and Indian men reflects how the issue of separation provided a venue for the
development of the idea of a Burmese national identity that excluded Indians. As
“[l]aws against intermarriage helped define racial boundaries and contributed to
the meaning of ‘race’ itself,” the stigmatization of intermarriage reflects the
racialization of the Bamar and how Separationists deliberately fought against the
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persistence of a plural society in favor of an imagined community of a Burma for
the Bamar.203
The specificity of anti-Indian sentiment espoused by the Separationists
during a period that overlapped with the rural Saya San Rebellion, which did not
start as an anti-Indian movement, can be attributed to an increasing divide
between the demographics of urban and rural Burma. In Rangoon, where the
Burmese Legislative Assembly held their debates, “Indians constituted over 55
percent of the total population of Rangoon and over 65 percent of the male
population.”204 Such a high concentration of Indians in Rangoon partially explains
why many male Bamar leaders felt as if “their” city was being overtaken by
foreigners. With a genuine influx of Indian immigrants, the ratio of Bamar to
Indian residents decreased and thus to Saya Myo it appeared that their “race” was
in danger of “extinction.” The idea that Burma was a “milch cow” for Indian
residents to drain of its resources became popular in part because of the high
proportion of Indian settlers in cities such as Rangoon. We have established in
Chapter Two that competition for land and labor in rural Burma between the
Bamar and Indians was often sensationalized in the nationalist press; however, "in
Rangoon factories 95 percent of the unskilled and 70 percent of the skilled labor
were reported to be Indian in 1928 and the position does not appear to have
changed since then."205 It appears that in the city where the Separationists camp
203
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made their arguments, the Bamar and Indians were in stiff competition for work.
While this does not excuse the aforementioned statements, the large concentration
of Indians in Rangoon, in particular, provides context for why many Bamar
nationalists viewed Indian immigrants with such hostility.
The Separationists represented the most vocal of the groups debating
Burma’s future both before and after the Simon Commission published its report;
however, their rise to popularity was slow and their xenophobic rhetoric was not
universally accepted. It was the anti-Separationists who won the 1932 Burma
Legislative Council elections and would maintain an elected majority until the
Government of Burma Act of 1935 formally separated Burma and India. The
widely accepted characterization of the anti-Separationists was that they
represented a broad group willing to work with the Indian National Congress to
fight for independence together, under the guise of Indians and Burmese as
victims of British oppression.206 Anti-Separationists such as U Pe Maung describe
this when writing that “when we spoke in our constituency on the subject of
Separation and Federation, we were much blamed and we were called, 'kalamet'
(lovers of Indians), and also impious people."207 The framing of the antiSeparationists as kalamet illustrates that to the Separationists, the antiSeparationists represented a pro-Indian party. Kalamet existing as a term itself
and being construed as an insult by the Separationists illustrates the degree to
which anti-Indian sentiment grew during the debate over separation from India.
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The shaming of a political party due to perceptions of being pro-Indian shows that
anti-Indian sentiment was becoming a normalized and even advantageous
ideology in urban Burma. However, prior to their electoral victory, the antiSeparationists sent a denunciation of separation to the Round Table Conference of
1930 and consistently refused to compromise with the British. It appeared that the
Separationists, always quick to label the anti-Separationists as kalamet and proBritish, were more willing to work with the British than the anti-Separationists.
The anti-Separationists defended their position and work with the Indian National
Congress by arguing that working towards independence in the long term was
more advantageous than working with the distrustful British in the present. They
justified anti-Separation through criticizing the British, not by saying that it would
help Indian business interests. Being a member of the 1930s Bamar community
now meant being anti-Indian and the “Separation Crisis” continued to provide a
platform for this rhetoric to diffuse.
Anti-Indian sentiment had circulated through all levels of the plural
society to such a great degree that suceeding in Burmese politics required publicly
espousing anti-Indian rhetoric. While the anti-Separationists appear to be less
anti-Indian than the Separationists, anti-Separationist campaign pamphlets still
harnessed anti-Indian sentiment to advance their election goals. A pamphlet titled
“Do not make a mistake by Voting for the Separationists,” Ramree Maung Maung
claims, “[even] if separation is affected, Indians cannot be driven out.
Immigration of Indians and other foreigners cannot be restricted. People cannot

111

indefinitely withhold payment of the debts which they owe to the Chettyars.”208
The anti-Separationist author argues that voting for the Separationists would
neither restrict Indian immigration nor relieve debt owed to the Chettiars–the
unacceptable status quo would be maintained. This was an attempt to convince
readers that a vote for the anti-Separationists would somehow change the status
quo and restrict Indian immigration and moneylending. The anti-Separationist
author is harnessing the fear of Indian immigration and therefore anti-Indian
sentiment as a weapon against the Separationists. This pamphlet illustrates the
extent to which anti-Indian sentiment gripped urban Burma and became a key
tenant of Bamar ethno-nationalism; the anti-Separationists, viewed as less
radically ethnonationalist, felt the need to take advantage of xenophobic feelings
to win an election. In rural contexts, the Wunthanu Athins, “own-race” village
organizations which provided support as an alternative to headmen, also
supported anti-separation by writing in a campaign pamphlet “[i]f separation is
effected now, the Indians (in Burma) will not have to go back; on the other hand,
their lives and property will be protected.”209 This message targeting a peasant
audience on behalf of the anti-Separationists is more inflammatory than the one
for urban readers as it scorned the protection of Indian lives. We see a merging of
anti-Indian sentiment from both a rural and urban sphere through this publication.
To win an election, the anti-Separationists needed to capitalize on Separationist
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rhetoric illustrating that much of the public viewed a “Burma for the Bamar” as
their imagined community. Sadly, this pragmatic act by the anti-Separationists
nonetheless did its part in fostering an equivalency between being Bamar and
anti-Indian during the “Separation Crisis.”
Even with the characterization of both the Separationists and antiSeparationist as anti-Indian to some degree, we must note that not all nationalists
supported race-baiting. Anti-Separationist Dr. Baw Maw said that nationalism “is
a very commendable and excellent thing, but it must be properly understood.
Nationalism must be an affirmative factor and if it takes a negative form, that is
the terrible form of race hatred."210 This unapologetic review of the dangers of
ethnonationalism and the racialization of the Bamar reflects that not all Bamar
nationalists agreed with the swelling anti-Indian sentiment in Burma. Baw Maw
warns his fellow legislatures that nationalism is key to independence but can also
be divisive, as we have seen so far. However, as shown by the anti-Separationist
messaging to the public, nationalists who disagreed with race hatred towards
Indians had little power to stop its proliferation.
In addition to capitalizing on the fear of Indian immigration to appease
Separationist voters, the anti-Separationist camp also used the fear of Indian and
Karen military occupation of Burma to advance their cause. As shown in Chapter
Two, the British use of the British Indian Army and troops from Burma’s ethnic
minorities was pivotal in establishing anti-minority rhetoric during the Saya San
Rebellion. The persistence of this fear and appropriation of it during the
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“Separation Crisis” is exemplified by the following statement from the Wunthanu
Athins:
If Burma is separated from India, a British regiment and a regiment
comprising of Gurkhas and Kachins, which will be five times as large as
the present armies, will be stationed in “Excluded Areas,” and the
expenditure for their maintenance will be met from the taxes given by the
Burmese people.211
Not only does this statement illustrate that the British decision to use troops from
ethnic minorities was a source of agitation for the Bamar population but it also
shows that the anti-Separationists were not a pro-Indian camp. Rather, the antiSeparationist harnessed and harnessed anti-Indian sentiment to advance their goal
of independence. In this case regarding British troops, the author uses Bamar
pride in their military history and contrasts this with the insult of having foreign
soldiers occupy Burma. Martial prowess represented a key tenant of Bamar
identity shared by both anti-Separationists and Separationists emphasized by the
statement “as long as Burma remains a part of India, its manhood will never have
a chance of acquiring military training… and the Burmese people, once famed as
a race of soldiers, are now in the sorry plight of being protected by foreign
mercenaries” from the Separation League.212 Increasing number of troops from
Burma’s ethnic minorities, and Indians in particular, was percieved as an insult
against Bamar ethnic identity. Therefore, we see that Bamar ethnonationalism as
an ideology was in direct opposition to a plural society which included Bamar and
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Indians. However, the anti-Separationists included many Indian elites such as Mr.
Ganga Singh who wanted to unite Indians and the Burmese against British rule
arguing that “the Indians are slaves, and you are in the same boat too. There is no
difference between a slave and a slave.”213 A mix of unifying and anti-Indian
rhetoric from the anti-Separationists adds nuance to their characterization as “proIndian.” The anti-Separationists did not base their platform solely on Bamar
ethnonationalism, but capitalization of anti-Indian rhetoric illustrated and added to
the persistence of the equivalency of pro-Bamar with anti-Indian.
The formal rhetoric of excluding Indians from an independent Burma even
persisted amongst the anti-Separationists in the more nuanced debates of the
Burma Legislative Council. While less obvious, U Tun Aung presented a Bamar
anti-Separationist double standard that Burma would not be welcoming to Indians
while still working with Indian members of the party. U Tun Aung writes:
"When such people command earn a living in Burma there is less chance
for Burmans to get work...though we practice the doctrine of love when
we find that our own countrymen are in a difficult situation in order to
earn their own living. we shall have to take up the cause of our own
countrymen. It is not because we hate others."214
Here he attempts to justify anti-Indian rhetoric by arguing that the Bamar are
struggling to compete with Indian labor and that resistance towards Indians was
not out of hate but out of a love for the Bamar. Regardless of whether U Tun
Aung truly hated Indians, his statement argues that either Indians or Bamar could
make a living in Burma but not both. This statement places a distinct value on
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Bamar ethnicity as a prerequisite for citizenship in an independent Burma,
exemplified by his description of his countrymen as Bamar and that “others”
threatened Bamar livelihood. One of the key tenants of a modern nation is the
ability for any citizen to make a living and concern here that “others” hinder the
Bamar from doing so illustrates that both anti-Separationist and Separationists
aimed to build a community for the ethnic Bamar. Anti-Indian sentiment was
normalized by the anti-Separationists and the perception that Indians are taking
wealth that could belong to the Bamar is shown by Figure Four. This political
cartoon portrays caricatures of Indians, Chinese, and Europeans plundering
Burma while a man representing Burma sits empty-handed. In particular, the
caricature of an Indian stepping towards India holding two full bags, as opposed
to the caricature of a Chinese man with only one bag suggest that Bamar
grievances at this time were directed particularly against Indians. However, this
cartoon meant for a general audience suggested that the three main non-Bamar
immigrant groups, Indians, Chinese, and Europeans were enemies of the Bamar
people. Thus, notions of a separate Burmese identity and borders with India
spurred by the “Separation Crisis” helped create a national identity based on the
exclusion of non-Bamar peoples and membership with the Bamar Buddhist
community.
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Figure 4: Cartoon, “The Man in the Middle is Left with an Empty Stomach.” There are four
caricatures representing the Bamar, Indian, British, and Chinese peoples. The British man is at the
bottom of the cartoon carrying a container reading “oil.” The Indian man is at the left carrying two
bags reading “rice” and “money.” The Chinese man is to the right carrying a bag reading
“money.” The Bamar man sits empty handed in the middle. Republished in The Immigration
Problem of Burma by U Thein Maung.215

Conclusions:
The Simon Commission and the subsequent debate over Burma’s
separation from India resulted in the metamorphosis of Bamar identity into the
national identity of an independent Burmese state. The Bamar never needed
convincing that Burma was not India but the British use of this rhetoric
legitimized Separationist claims that the peoples of Burma and India could not
share the same imagined community. With a British blessing in hand, the
Separationists moved along an ethno-nationalistic route to secure their “Burma for
the Burmans.” Through racializing the Bamar, the Separationists established a
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contrast and incompatibility between the Indians and Bamar to strengthen the
unity of the latter group. The move was successful as even the anti-Separationists,
traditionally viewed as more tolerant, capitalized on anti-Indian rhetoric in their
campaign pamphlets to garner support for their cause. Both nationalist groups
using anti-Indian rhetoric in their campaigns illustrates how the “Separation
Crisis” contributed to the development of a Burmese national identity centered
around Bamar ethnicity and being anti-Indian. Anti-Indian sentiment broadened
and crossed the urban and rural divide as Wunthanu Athin village organizations
took an anti-Indian stance but aligned with the anti-Separationists. Broad antiIndian sentiment gripped the Bamar population both at the end of the Saya San
Rebellion and at the height of the “Separation Crisis” concurrently in 1932.
However, separation was not decided by the Burmese but by the British.
Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of national self-determination served as a beacon of
hope for Bamar nationalists on both sides, but the British would not allow these
rights for their non-European subjects. In 1933, seeing that the Burmese
Legislative Council remained a house divided, the British Parliament decided that
it would decide upon the fate of Burma. It passed the Government of Burma Act
in 1935 which formally separated Burma and India into two separate colonies.216
The “Separation Crisis” ended without a consensus from the Burmese Legislative
Council but the anti-Indian and ethnonationalist campaigning set a precedent for
the direction Bamar nationalist rhetoric took. The next challenge for Bamar
nationalists would be to fight for full independence from Britain. The anti-Indian
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and minority sentiment spurred by the “Separation Crisis” would dictate the
actions of patriotic Bamar in the next swell of nationalism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“Our Burma, Not Yours”: Bamar Ethnonationalist Conceptions of a
Burmese Nation-State Told Through the Anti-Indian Riots of 1938
A Burmese hand did not resolve the “Separation Crisis”; the British
Parliament passed the Government of Burma Act in 1935 which separated Burma
and India in 1937, infringing on the agency of the Bamar nationalists and fueling
their ethnonationalist sentiment. By 1935, the Separation League’s rhetoric of a
“Burma for the Burmans” had not only become normalized but also widely
supported by both members of the Bamar peasantry and urban middle-class.
Ethnic-nationalism had brought together people from both urban and rural areas
under the shared idea of a Bamar racial identity solidified through demonizing
Indians as the enemy of the Bamar “race.” These perceptions became part of a
new Burmese civic and ethnic identity; thus, the act of separation would have no
muting effect on Bamar ethnonationalism, desires for independence from Britain,
and anti-Indian sentiment. In contrast, separation only served to bolster the most
extreme forms of this rhetoric because the Separationists could now take credit for
the Government of Burma Act and claim political victory.217 To the laymen, the
Separationists and their anti-Indian campaigning, while failing to win a majority
in the Legislative Council Elections of 1932, were powerful enough to extract
“concessions” from Parliament and would be the best camp to follow on the road
to full national independence. Landless Bamar agriculturalists, urban workers, and
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members of a growing professional middle, class whom all felt like second-class
citizens to Indians, had no reason to stop embracing the ethnic-nationalism which
had appeared to secure them a separate government from India–another crucial
step towards full independence. The volatility of this sentiment would materialize
with the dissemination of passages from Moulvi-Yogi Awada Sadan, a littleknown book critical of Buddhism, in the vernacular press.
Written by Maung Shwe Hpi and published in 1931, Moulvi-Yogi Awada
Sadan also called Moulvi and Yogi Wada contained inflammatory dialogue that
deemed Buddhism to be an “inferior religion” to Islam.218 Although the work
went unnoticed immediately after its publication, his ideas were revived with the
1938 publication of Maung Htin Baw’s The Abode of a Nat, which contained
excerpts from Maung Shwe Hpi’s book.219 However, Moulvi-Yogi Awada Sadan
was not meant to widely distributed, it was inaccessible to many Burmese without
fluency in Pali language.220 Meanwhile, The Abode of a Nat was in Burmese and
“Maung Htin Baw saw, and seized, an opportunity to get a little publicity and
cheap advertising for his novel by publishing what he recognized as being a
sensational discovery.”221 Within 10 days, 1350 copies of The Abode of a Nat
were sold to a Burmese audience, and almost immediately after vernacular outlets
like Thuriya, called for “drastic action” to be taken.222 Between July 23rd to July
26th, Thuriya headlines demanded, “BUDDHISM HAS BEEN INSULTED.
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TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS.”223 This was a call to action and prompted a protest
at the Shwedagon Pagoda, one of the holiest in Myanmar, on July 26th. Seeking to
control the situation, the British authorities forbade Thuriya from publishing for
two weeks and demanded a security of 3,000 rupees.224
The demonstration at Shwedagon, led by the All Burma Council of Young
Pongyis Association, was well attended by followers of the intense Bamar
ethnonationalist U Saw who expressed Saw’s extreme beliefs through acts of
inter-ethnic violence.225 What began as an act of civil disobedience turned violent
when demonstrators quickly became excited and mobilized.226 The demonstrators
marched from the Shwedagon Pagoda towards the “Soortee (Indian) Bazaar in
downtown Rangoon” where when “the police attempted to halt the procession, it
degenerated into a mob bent on taking vengeance on Muslim Indians.”227 Among
the rioters, were young yellow-robed pongyis (Buddhist monks) who were chased
and attacked by the colonial police. This assault on pongyis was particularly
inflammatory and held parallels to when British Indian Army soldiers fired upon
Saya San’s followers.
The impact of the nationalist press in fomenting anti-Muslim and antiIndian sentiment and violence cannot be understated. Vernacular Burmese
nationalist newspapers like New Light of Burma and Thuriya, accused Indian and
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British officers of deliberately singling out monks for attack.228 Images of monks,
bloody from police charging into the crowd with batons, plastered front pages and
helped to spread the rioting to districts such as Henzada and Myanaung hundreds
of miles away.229 Rioters armed with dahs (knives) targeted Indian Muslims,
sacked mosques, and subjected Indians to brutal violence. In one of many
gruesome acts, rioters hacked off the hand of an Indian man living on 11th Street
in Rangoon.230 In particular, rioters targeted Muslim Indians and sacked mosques;
however, Indian Hindus, were also subject to violence.231 British police acted just
as violently, firing into crowds in such an indiscriminate manner than the Final
Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee investigated 27 accounts of police firearm
negligence during the riots and found three cases of misconduct.232 It is important
to consider the widespread scale of the rioting, which reached over ten districts
and resulted in significant casualties of 1227 people killed or injured by both
rioters and police.233 But this raises the question, what instigated the riots?
While it may seem on the surface that Maung Shwe Hpi’s book was the
cause of the rioting, it was rather a trigger which unleashed underlying discontent.
Even the myopic British administration who cited religious superstition as the
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cause of the Saya San Rebellion understood that the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were
the culmination of growing conflict between the Bamar and Indians. From
analyzing the British’s interim and final reports, regarding the riots, they failed to
admit that it was their negligence that set the stage for the chaos at hand. Growing
Bamar ethnonationalism, spurred by “agrarian discontent” and continually
growing anti-Indian sentiment since the “Separation Crisis,” turned Lower Burma
into a powder keg. A new racialization of Indian Muslims, Indian Hindus, and
Burmese Muslims collectively as kala, a pejorative for Indian or South Asian,
became a convenient epithet for co-colonialist.234 Maung Shwe Hpi’s book was
simply the lit match that caused both urban and rural Burma to combust into what
Matthew Bowser describes as “anti-Indian and Islamophobic pogroms.”235
I am presenting the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots as the last case study in this
thesis because it is the culmination of the unresolved tensions of the Saya San
Rebellion and “Separation Crisis.” The Saya San Rebellion began as a solely anticolonial movement, targeting Bamar village headmen, Europeans, and Chettiars
but it eventually grew into a general anti-Indian uprising that sowed the seeds of
Bamar ethnic-nationalism. Land moving into the hands of Chettiars drove Bamar
peasants to join Saya San’s uprising but the British suppression of the uprising by
force did not fix any land tenure issues. The “Separation Crisis” saw the
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development of a Bamar racial identity and the establishment of the idea that
Indians threatened the existence of the Bamar race. Indians further became an outgroup and being Burmese meant being anti-Indian to many urban Bamar. As the
previous chapters demonstrated, none of the grievances which led to the
aforementioned nationalist sentiments had been addressed by the British.
Tellingly, the Anti-Indian Riots of 1938 occurred both in the countryside and the
cities; the participants consisted of Bamar farmers concerned about their loss of
land as well as urbanites still living in a plural society with the ethnic-nationalist
rhetoric of the “Separation Crisis” fresh in their minds. The rioters came from a
wide range of demographics and were united in their mutual hatred of both
Muslim and Hindu Indian minorities.
The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were a mass expression of brewing
grievances, but they were also an expression of political agitation against a leftist
government, led by anti-Separationist Dr. Baw Maw, who was willing to
negotiate with colonialists to secure long term independence. In the general
elections of 1936, to choose a government for a Burma separated from India, Baw
Maw was elected prime minister and formed “a coalition government with
Burmese moderates and the European, Indian, and Karen reserved seats.”236 Baw
Maw and his Sinyetha (“proletarian”) party proposed restructuring village
administration, making the village headmen an elected position, and agricultural
tenant protection to help the Burmese peasant.237 By working with ethnic groups
perceived as co-colonialists, Baw Maw’s government appeared to be yet another
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government of collaborators who would not secure a future for the Bamar “race,”
an identity that had only grown stronger. In contrast, the Burmese right-wing
formed a league of political parties called the Ngabwinsaing (“five-flowers
alliance”) which based their platform on creating a “Burma for the Burmans.”238
Both political ideologies tried to win over the members of the Dobama Asiayone,
who called themselves the Thakins, as they were a grassroots organization of
intellectuals that connected to the urban working class.239 However, in the 1936
elections, the Thakins began formally incorporating the idea of thudo-bama,
meaning “their-Burma” into Thakin rhetoric.240 The “their” in question
represented co-colonialists in-general but more specifically Indians. A fear that
the agents of thudo-bama were working to sabotage Burmese independence and
“soil” the Bamar “race” pushed the grassroots Dobama Asiayone towards the
Burmese right-wing.
The politicization of anti-Indian rhetoric forming the platform of a major
political alliance, the Ngabwinsaing (Five Flowers Alliance), demonstrated that in
1936 the idea of a Burmese “imagined community” rested on the pressing issue of
whether the legislature should focus on creating a Burma explicitly for the
Burmans.241 We shall see that the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were a product of the
synthesis of growing Islamophobia with the three main characteristics of Burmese
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national identity described thus far: Buddhism, Bamar racial identity, and antiIndian sentiment. The result was a Burmese national identity consisting of being a
Bamar Buddhist critical of both Indians and Islam–an identity that transcended
the rural and urban divide. The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were a nation-building
event, the formal political affiliations of the riot’s instigators, namely U Saw,
illustrated that their goal was to build a new Burmese nation by purging Burma of
their perceived enemies. Rioting served as a disturbance to the status quo which
allowed the precipitation of new legislation favorable to Bamar ethnicnationalists. The widespread targeting of Indians, both Muslim and Hindu, by
Thakins, peasants, urbanites, and even village headmen in 1938 defined the
Burmese “imagined community” as one only for Bamar Buddhists. U Saw would
replace Baw Maw as prime minister in 1940 signaling that Bamar ethnonationalism had been victorious, providing the formal political capabilities for the
construction of a “Burma for the Burmans.”

Buddhism, Islamophobia, the Nationalist Press, and a New Burmese National
Identity
Official British reports claim that the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots “were not
religious riots. They were political”; however, the broad participation of pongyis,
the Islamophobia stoked by the nationalist press, and our understanding of the
importance of Buddhism to Bamar ethnic identity warrants a discussion on how
an insult to Buddhism reinforced the religion as a tenant of a new Burmese
national identity. The agents of Buddhism, namely the pongyis, would use the
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religion as a political tool, to unite Bamar peoples against Indians and Islam in
particular. Rioters across Myaungmya, Maubin, Pyapon, Henzada, Prome,
Toungoo, and Pegu districts who would “never know most of their fellowmembers” were nonetheless united through the imagination of a Burmese
Buddhist community.242 The Buddhism that the rioters fought to protect was the
same unique Burmese Buddhism that incorporated Nat spirits, was geographically
limited to Burma, and insulted by Maung Shwe Hpi’s book. “Tattooing for
invulnerability” and charms appeared on rioters, reflecting the persistence of the
Saya San’s uprising in the formation of Burmese identity six years later.243 Monks
taking to the streets in the defense of Burmese Buddhism became a pillar of an
imagined Burmese national identity that was both “limited and sovereign.”
The idea that a Burmese state free of British control would be Buddhist
dated back to the Saya San Rebellion, but in 1938 the nationalist press specified
that Buddhism and the “nation” were joined by blood–racializing both. In an
article titled “The Mass Meeting in Connection with the Insult Against Religion
on Account of National and Religious Prides,” which quoted speeches given at
the Shwedagon Pagoda demonstration, Thuriya called on the Bamar to avenge the
insult to Buddhism described as an insult to the nation of Burma. The following
was written on July 27th, 1938:
It is necessary to show the external and internal blood to punish those who
have insulted the Religion. Everyone knows that Burmans are in a state of
ruination day by day. It does not end at passing Resolution. The journey is
not thus reached you are requested to take a warning. The insult has
reached its highest pitch. Our Nation has been insulted. Why is that? Is it
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not because we are forbearing all these quietly. They [Muslims] are living
on this land and are drinking this water.244
The author argues that Buddhism and the Burmese nation are one entity as they
characterize an insult to “our religion” in the same vein as an insult to “our
Nation.” To defend Buddhism does not mean defending just a religion but now it
meant defending the Bamar imagined community “from ruination.” In contrast to
the Saya San Rebellion’s struggle to return to a pre-colonial state, the author
describes their imagined community as a “nation” with a clear “in-group” and
“out-group” consisting of Bamar Buddhists and Muslims, respectively.
As one of the key pillars of nationhood is sovereignty, the statement that
the land and water were reserved for Bamar Buddhists illustrates how the 1938
Riots were a call to limit membership to the Burmese community, and the
privilege associated with membership, to Bamar Buddhists. Land and water give
life to people, thus restricting land and water within a territory to the Bamar
Buddhists is itself a threat saying that Muslims in Burma will not be able to
survive in this new vision for a Burmese nation. Furthermore, the call for violence
to punish those who insulted Buddhism and Burma not only illustrates the degree
to which the author felt offended by Maung Shwe Hpi’s book but also calls on
members of the imagined community to lay down their lives for its preservation.
Nothing illustrates a devotion to the community aspect of a nation than a “deep
horizontal comradeship” often expressed as a being willing to “die for such
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limited imaginings.”245 This call existing in a widely circulated newspaper shows
that it was meant to be read by Burmese-speaking people hundreds of miles apart
with no contact with each other. Thus, the author is trying to inculcate the sense
that any reader could be a part of the community so long as they are part of the
Bamar Buddhist in-group and take active steps to defend Buddhism. This sense of
belonging even when a person has not met other members of the community is
what makes it “imagined.” Therefore, the author uses defending Buddhism to
express a Burmese state and identity which was limited, imagined, and a
community, the characteristics of Benedict Anderson’s definition of a nation
which in this case was Bamar and Buddhist.
The articles published in Thuryia in the days after the July 26
demonstrations, which would exacerbate anti-Indian and Islamophobic rhetoric,
reinforced the conception of Muslims as an out-group in the Burmese nation.
Rather than using its platform during the riots to immediately place blame on the
British, Thuriya intended to portray the gathering at Shwedagon as a patriotic
defense of Buddhism and the nation against a Muslim enemy. In addition to
portraying the demonstration as patriotic, Thuriya encouraged violence as the
civic duty of Burmese citizens. In a passage titled “If I Am a Dictator,” citing a
Shwedagon speech, the speaker stated:
You say you cannot bear patiently when any one touches your religion and
Nation. Your religion is now attacked. Will you keep quiet? ‘We will not
forbear. (Voices). What will you do if you cannot forbear? We will beat.
(Voices). What will you do when this meeting is over? We will go down
and beat. (Voices).’ In the ancient times when the Buddhist religion was
insulted, Datsayo Ngapo was crucified. If we were the dictators, the
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Muslims who insulted the religion would also be ordered to be crucified.
(Applause).246
In another call to arms, the speaker argued that the Buddhist religion represented a
pillar of the Burmese nation and that both were under attack by Muslims. The use
of “Nation” illustrated to a degree not yet seen before, the existence of a modern
Burmese national identity and an intent to spread this identity to Burmese
speakers. In contrast to Saya San and the early Dobama Asiayone whose
platforms were based on kingship and the idea of a “Burma for the Burmans”
respectively, the rhetoric from the 1938 Riots suggested that the Bamar Buddhists
were members of a modern national community. In addition to defending
Buddhism, the idea of someone defiling their nation motivated the demonstrators
at Shwedagon to “beat.” The speaker deliberately uses the term “nation” to
remind the audience what was at stake and why immediate violent action against
the constructed out-group was “justified.” Violence against Muslims not only
illustrates how the speaker and the broader Bamar audience did not welcome
Muslims into this Burmese nation but also that the idea of an imagined
community was strong enough that it could spur a crowd to try and purge Burma
of its Muslims in the name of a Burmese nation. Furthermore, the idea that the
Bamar Buddhists could be “dictators” is an attempt to return the agency to rule
back to the Bamar from the co-colonialists, reflecting that even after separation
the Bamar still felt like second-class citizens. To the Bamar cheering the speaker,
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a post-colonial Burma would be controlled by them under the guidance of
Buddhism in opposition to both Muslim and Hindu Indians.
Rioting extended beyond Rangoon despite the first instance of it occurring
at the Shwedagon Pagoda; the pongyis and laymen participating in these outlying
districts fought for the same reason of defending Buddhism, yet they had most
likely never met those gathered at the steps of Shwedagon. In the district of
Myingyan, over 200 miles from Rangoon on the 31st of July, “a mob of about a
hundred pongyis and fifty Burmans started to attack Indians with dahs [knives]
and sticks.”247 In this district the British cited “the inflammatory accounts in the
vernacular newspapers of the riots in Rangoon reach[ing] Myingyan District
about the 30th of July” as the cause of this “communal antagonism.”248 Without
the vernacular press, the pongyis and laymen of Myingyan would probably have
not heard of the events in Rangoon for quite some time, yet both Buddhist monks
and Bamar villagers immediately took to violence. In Shwebo Town which was a
similar distance from Rangoon as Myingyan, the British describe how “we find
that the disturbance starting almost as soon as news and rumors reached it from
Rangoon. It started on the 30th of July and tensions prevailed until the 13th of
August.”249 The immediate call to arms once news reached these outlying districts
suggests an underlying sentiment that Burma was a Buddhist community and thus
an insult to the religion was intolerable. It is reasonable to assume that the
Thuriya article cited on page 93, published on July 27th the day after the meeting
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at Shwedagon, was the first news of the situation in these districts on July 30th.
British reports believed “newspapers contributed to the disturbance which broke
out immediately afterwards” in Yandoon, specifically “issues of the New Light of
Burma and the Sun [Thuriya] containing pictures of the alleged happenings in
Rangoon.”250 A British emphasis on how rioting quickly spread as a result of the
press, whom reported an “insult” to Buddhism, suggests that Burmese Buddhism
was already a tenet of Burmese identity which the press used to encourage
demonstrations and Bamar Buddhist unity. The rioters did not need to be
convinced to take up arms against Indian members of the plural society; thus,
Burmese communal membership from here on was restricted to Bamar Buddhists.
While Maung Shwe Hpi’s book ignited pre-existing tensions between the
Bamar and Indians, the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were an expression of anti-Muslim
anger in addition to being an anti-Indian riot in general. The passages in Thuriya
illustrated that the demonstrators at Shwedagon did not see Indian Muslims as
members of their community; furthermore, this sentiment was expressed through
violence in the provinces distal to Rangoon as well. In Mandalay, six mosques
were reported to have been damaged by rioters while only one Hindu temple was
damaged while in Shwebo all reported damages to religious structures were to
mosques.251 At the conclusion of the mass violence, the rioters had destroyed only
two Hindu temples in comparison to 74 mosques throughout Burma.252 In the
districts outside of Rangoon, 89.71% of calculated property losses belonged to

250

Ibid., 71.
Government of Burma. Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, Appendix XII.
252
Bowser, “Misdirected Rage: The Fascist Response to Co-Colonialism and Capitalism in Burma
and the Origins of Burmese Islamophobia, 1929-1942,” 232.
251

133

Indian Muslims while 9.56% belonged to Indian Hindus illustrating that Bamar
rioters specifically targeted Indian Muslims but also that Indian Hindus could not
escape a general anti-Indian sentiment and violence.253 The deadly impact of
Islamophobia can also be seen in the loss of life by September 24th of 1938 when
rioters reportedly killed 139 Indian Muslims and 25 Indian Hindus.254 The
perpetration of islamophobia fueled violence outside of Rangoon further shows
the deep-seated Islamophobia and its role in creating a Burmese identity where
Indian Muslims became another “out-group” for the Bamar Buddhists to imagine
themselves as the “in-group” of a post-colonial Burma.
British classifications of their subjects, based on race and religion,
contributed to a “less fluid conceptualization of ethnic identity” that provided the
environment for inter-ethnic conflict between Bamar Buddhists and Indian
Muslims.255 The Riot Inquiry Committee’s final report specifically categorizes
Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus as distinct. When discussing rioting in the
Minbu district, the British describe stones thrown at an “Indian barber’s shop”
and an arson attempt at a separate “large Muslim shop.”256 The British employed
these categories as a means of “social segregation,” integral to their practice of
“divide and rule,” with religion being “the dominant qualifier of race.”257 As a
result of British divisions, there was “the heightening of racial, religious, and
ethnic consciousness in Burma” which led to increasingly exclusive identities.

253

Government of Burma, Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, 285.
Ibid., 281.
255
Ikeya, Refiguring Women, Colonialism, and Modernity in Burma, 27.
256
Government of Burma, Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, 220.
257
Ikeya, Refiguring Women, Colonialism, and Modernity in Burma, 26.
254

134

With exclusivity, comes the need to protect that specific identity; thus, for Bamar
Buddhists who viewed themselves as Burma’s “in-group,” there existed a
heightened willingness to fight the Indian Muslim “out-group.” Much like in the
“Separation Crisis,” British racism provided the Bamar nationalists and their press
with a means to characterize Indian Muslims as inherently alien to the territory of
Burma and Bamar Buddhist culture.
The virulence of Islamophobia in 1938 emerged in part due to a
developing conviction that Indian Muslims were attempting to establish their own
separate Burmese identity called thudo-bama (“their Burma”) in opposition to the
Bamar conception of dobama (“our Burma”). The 1938 Riots solidified an
“imagined community” for the Burmese Buddhists around fears that Indian
Muslims were sabotaging a Burmese Buddhist country and the Bamar race. An
article written by U Paduma titled “Burmese Blood” from the New Light of
Burma stated that:
Burma is a Buddhist country. Peoples professing other religions come to
Burma, the country of the Buddhist, without hindrance... they have been
eating the flesh and sucking the life-blood of the Burmese... seducing
Burmese Buddhist women to become their wives, causing dissension in
order to create such communities as Dobama Muslim [We Burmese
Muslim].258
U Paduma’s grievances centered on this vision of Muslims as threats to the
Burmese nation, articulated through the lenses of religion, gender, and ethnicity.
By framing Burma as a Buddhist country, he asserted that Burmese identity was
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both territorially and religiously exclusive, and that any religious plurality would
be to the detriment of the Burmese community. By opening with Burma as a
Buddhist country and arguing that outsiders are coming into Burma, U Paduma
airs that Burmese identity was exclusive to Buddhists and those from within
Burma’s colonial borders. Burma’s Hindu and Muslim Indian population did not
fit into U Paduma’s image of Burma. As the Bamar were Buddhist with few
exceptions, U Paduma also argues that all Indians threatened the Bamar “race”
through intermarriage–which would result in “racial degeneration.” This
“marriage question” was gendered, as by speaking out against intermarriage, U
Paduma characterizes Burmese women as “pure” and in need of protection from
“impure” Muslim men actively “seducing” Burmese women. Therefore, Burmese
women came to represent the vessels for upholding Bamar “racial purity” and
thus the Burmese imagined community. U Paduma’s fear-mongering rhetoric that
Muslims were trying to create their own separate Dobama Muslim community
convinces the reader that the Burmese Buddhist nation was “under attack” by
Muslim “agents.” The fear that Muslims were molding dobama into thudo-bama
encouraged the construction of a Bamar Buddhist nation through a purge of
Burma’s Muslims. An idea of “them-ness” empowers the sentiment of “us-ness”
thus the idea of a Burmese nation grew stronger reciprocally with flourishing
Islamophobia, anti-Indian sentiment, and the fear of Dobama Muslim.259
One of the ways in which Bamar Buddhists feared that dobama would
become thudo-bama or Dobama Muslim was through intermarriage between
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Bamar Buddhist women and Indian Muslim men, a fear which exacerbated
tensions during the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots. Bamar Buddhists framed their
concerns over intermarriage as protecting the agency of Buddhist women,
believing that the inheritance shared by Bamar women if her Muslim husband
died would be less than that if she had married a Buddhist man.260 A column from
Thuriya titled “Burmese National Girls and Male Foreigners” from July 27, 1938,
covering speeches at Shwedagon argued that “the position of Burmese women
married to the Foreigners is not better than a slave.”261 While the Bamar Buddhist
men claimed to be fighting intermarriage for the “protection” of Bamar women, it
was more likely that the antagonism against intermarriage was to prevent the
survival of Islam in their imagined community. The same article from Thuriya
then described how “U Sandawuntha Ashinmyat read from an Urdu book, from
which it said that Muslims marrying Burmese women amounted to the
propagation of Islam.”262 It was the fear that Buddhism would be replaced by
Islam in Burma, and the mischaracterization that Muslims were actively trying to
convert Buddhists to Islam, that contributed to the violent Islamophobia expressed
in 1938. The attempt to pass bills through the Burmese legislature, “to remedy the
wrongs the Burmese national women are suffering on account of inter-marriage,”
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further illustrates that to be Burmese according to members of the governing body
was to distinctly be neither Muslim nor Indian in general.263
The desired effect of making Burma’s Muslim population feel that
dobama would not welcome them was ultimately successful; 1938 represented the
beginning of the end for the plural society in favor of a “Burma for the Burmans.”
Ethnic and religious nationalist rhetoric from the 1938 Riots showed Burma’s
Indian Muslim and Hindu populations that compromise was no longer an option
and that all “kala” needed to vacate Burma at once. Burma’s “Zerbadi”
community (children of Indian Muslim men and Bamar Buddhist women)
expressed the following to the editor of the Rangoon Gazette:
“We do not know whether we are to be called Burmans or Indians. Neither
the Burmans nor the Indians will accept us for one of them…The Burmans
call us Kalas (Indians) and denounce us as their enemies…Burma is the
only place we know…Except for religion, we are Burmese in every
respect…Burma is our only country…but now we find that our Burma
brothers have forsaken us…Now we fear that unless something is done the
community is in danger of annihilation or ruin if not loss of identity.
600,000 Zerbadis”264
The plight of the Zerbadis illustrates the extent to which the 1938 Anti-Indian
Riots created an atmosphere where Muslims felt that their lives and community
identity were in danger of annihilation. Rioters killed many Muslims as we have
seen but the pleas of 600,000 Muslim Zerbadis to the Rangoon Gazette not only
shows the integral role the Burmese nationalist press had in stoking Islamophobia
but also how Burmese Muslims felt that a previously accepting plural community
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had now changed from this point onwards. The Zerbadis’ expression that “Burma
is our only country” conveys that they felt like stakeholders in a Burmese
community and had imagined themselves as Burmese with no desire to move to
India. The sudden change from Zerbadis believing in a harmonious Burmese
community to expressing their fears illustrates how extreme Bamar ethnicnationalist and Buddhist nationalist sentiment became in 1938. An emphasis on
“country,” brotherhood with the Bamar, and religion powerfully conveys that a
Burmese national identity was being born prior to 1938 and that the Zerbadis
imagined themselves as part of this “imagined community.” It is also worth
considering that British divide and rule influenced the distinctions made between
Zerbadis and Bamar Buddhists. British sources describe how “though their
[Zerbadis] Indian parentage is usually obvious in their features, most Zerbadis
speak Burmese and wear Burmese costume.”265 Highlighting that “features”
would distinguish Zerbadis despite their linguistic and costume similarities to the
Bamar culture reflects how British concepts of race instilled the idea that
Zerbadis, who are culturally like the Bamar, could not be members of the Bamar
community due to constructed racial and religious differences. This plea
demonstrates that a new Burmese identity had developed, one that was best
characterized as “Burma for the Burmans,” and the 1938 Riots were a purge of
other identities from Burma.
The anti-Indian racism fomented during the “Separation Crisis,” adapted
from Western racism, was the main source of anti-Zerbadi sentiment, namely that
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children of Indian and Bamar mixed marriages “soiled” the Burmese race. While
the Zerbadis became subject to criticism for their existence, Bamar nationalists
placed an extreme amount of pressure on Buddhist women to uphold the “purity”
of the Bamar race. U Kamara, President of the Rangoon Central Thathana
Mamaka Young Sanghas’ Association, at the Shwedagon demonstration,
“suggested that a procession should be taken out along the Pagoda Road to ‘the
Soortee Bara Bazaar as soon as the meeting was over ‘in order to show the real
blood of the Burmese people who would not tolerate any insult to their race and
religion.’” The audience responded by shouting “’Burmese who marry Indians!
Are husbands scarce in Burma?’”266 Not only did U Kamara’s statement reflect
that “race and religion” became a way to categorize how “Burmese” an individual
was but also the response from the audience suggested that it was the
responsibility of women to uphold Bamar “racial purity” and religion. Thus,
Burmese women who married Indian men were “un-Burmese” and became
scapegoats for when Bamar race and religion appear to be challenged. By asking
if “husbands are scarce in Burma,” in response to Burmese women marrying
Indians, the demonstrators argue that Indians do not count as Burmese husbands
and are therefore not Burmese by account of their “race.” This shows how
embedded anti-Indian sentiment became in the general Bamar zeitgeist and that
Indians, as well as Zerbadis, did not have a place in a Bamar nationalist imagined
community. Another point that stands out is that complaints were leveled against
Burmese women who married Indian men but not against Burmese men who
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married Indian women. The demonstrators at Shwedagon upheld patriarchy by
blaming Burmese women who married Indians for “soiling” the Bamar race while
Burmese men were concurrently liberated of this burden.
The mere idea of Zerbadis living in Burma after 1938 continued to be used
by Bamar ethnonationalists to stoke fear that the Bamar “race” was disintegrating
and thus action from women needed to be taken to preserve it. In an article titled
“Burmese Women Who Took Indians,” from the Burmese language magazine
10,000,000, the author proclaims:
You Burmese women who fail to safeguard your own race, after you have
married an Indian, your daughter whom you have begotten by such a tie
takes an Indian as her husband. As for your son, he becomes a half-caste
and tries to get a pure Burmese woman. Not only you but your future
generation also is those who are responsible for the ruination of the
race.267
The author suggests that marriage to an Indian would not only be a short-term
“problem” but would also destroy the Bamar “race” in the long term.
Characterizing the “half-caste” son as trying to “get a pure-Burmese women”
inculcates the idea that children of mixed ancestry–Zerbadis–are not “pure”
Burmese and therefore all of their subsequent children would also be contributing
to the “ruination of the race.” The fear that the children of mixed descent would
marry an Indian or a Burmese woman, both perceived negatively, portrays these
descendants as carrying some transmissible element of sin; especially in the case
of the “half-caste” son, the author leads the reader into believing that the “purity”
of Burmese women would continuously be violated by even a drop of non-Bamar
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blood. Such intense racism, especially the idea that the longevity of the Bamar
“race” would approach ruination, conveys that the future Burmese imagined
community would be built upon anti-miscegenation targeting the non-Bamar.
The racialization of the Bamar was grounded in Western philosophies
regarding race as shown in The Immigration Problem of Burma, published in
1939, where U Thein Maung cites the American immigration restrictions, based
on the idea that “every nation has the right to protect itself from deterioration by
racial discrimination,” as a positive “achievement.”268 The praise of American
racism illustrates that Bamar nationalists used racist ideas from the Western
nations to argue that if the Burmese nation was to become “great,” it must also
use the idea of race as the basis for solving “issues” such as competition for labor
and land tenure. Bamar ethnic-nationalists, especially the former Separationists,
believed that for Burma to be a true “modern” nation, it needed to have policies
that maintained “racial purity,” much like the imperialist West.
Race and religion defined Burmese national identity with an emphasis on
being neither Indian nor Muslim, exemplified by Bamar village headmen siding
with rioters in 1938. Where thugyis (village headmen) had once unabashedly
served as agents of the colonial state, in 1938 “[i]t has been one of the general
complaints but forward by the Indians of Burma that the Thugyis to whom they
looked for help as often as not sided with the rioters against them.”269 The
confidence that Indian residents had that headmen would come to their aid tells
how the headmen became an agent of the British–Bamar peasants had lost this
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confidence as illustrated by the Saya San Rebellion. However, the active
participation of headmen in the riots, headmen whose livelihoods were dependent
on the British, suggests that the headmen now held greater affinity towards the
Bamar Buddhists than Indians in general. To give up a position of power and take
part in the rioting illustrates the degree to which extreme anti-Indian sentiment
fueled the rioting and created an expanded in-group that now included village
headmen.
The co-colonialist position of the headmen had previously made them
outcasts from the Burmese imagined community of the Saya San Rebellion and
the “Separation Crisis;” however, a hatred of Indians had united Bamar
Buddhists, including headmen, into an identity characterized as not being a
member of a constructed Indian “out-group.” This shift in the allegiance of many
headmen was not isolated as “[w]ere there a few such incidents it might be
possible to dismiss them…but they are so many and they are out forward with
such uniformity…that we are compelled to believe that there must be in many of
them some substantial foundation of truth.”270 The mass participation of headmen
in violence against Indians illustrates that being a Bamar Buddhist,
conceptualized as not being Indian was indeed an “imagined” identity as headmen
across vast geography all felt compelled to act in the same way. Bamar Buddhist
rioters accepting the headmen into the crowd illustrates that uniting against an
out-group consisting of Indians helped develop a Burmese identity centering on
being Bamar Buddhist rather than one’s position in the colonial state. Burmese
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identity had evolved, reciprocally with intensifying anti-Indian sentiment and
Islamophobia, into a position where Bamar Buddhist headmen could now join a
new Burmese community through anti-Indian action.
To the Bamar rioters, the intense government crackdown on the 1938
Anti-Indian Riots illustrated that the British took the side of the Indians in
opposition to the Bamar Buddhists. The escalation of the riots both by British
forces and the rioters themselves provided a platform for the nationalist press to
display the indiscriminate violence of the British police and amalgamate the
Bamar population against a common colonialist enemy. While the “Separation
Crisis” saw divisions between Bamar nationalists regarding whether cooperating
with or challenging British machinations would lead to long-term Burmese
independence, the British crackdown on the 1938 Riots, in the same vein as the
suppression of Saya San’s uprising, was a uniting force for all Bamar Buddhists
against the British colonial system and its perceived Indian allies.
Central to the association of Indians with the oppression of the Bamar
Buddhists during the 1938 Riots were the images of British and Indian policemen
beating and disgracing “venerable sangha.” An image published on the 27th of
July in the New Light of Burma shows a Burmese monk lying unconscious on the
ground after a European sergeant beat him amidst onlookers (Fig. 5).271 To any
Bamar Buddhist, such an image could be perceived as religious persecution in the
name of protecting Indians. The New Light of Burma deliberately published this
image because of its inflammatory nature and utility as a tool to unite all
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Buddhists, including an urban Bamar readership, into acting against the British
and perceived Indian allies. Since the majority of Indians in Burma were either
Muslim or Hindu, and the British Christian, an attack on Buddhist monks looked
as if Buddhism was to be supplanted by “foreign religions.” Both the Buddhist
urban elite as well as peasants in the countryside could see the image and
understand that “Buddhism has been insulted” by agents of the British colonial
system, and that united action needed to be taken to stop these atrocities. It is
likely that this image appeared in the articles of the vernacular press which the
British cited as inflaming the outlying districts immediately after July 26th.
Images in the nationalist press sparking riots far from Rangoon reflect that the
portrayal of the British crackdown on the 1938 Riots further alienated British and
Indians from the Bamar majority. To the urban and rural Bamar, because Indians
were the primary victims of the riots, the crackdown appeared to be in the name
of protecting the Indian “enemy.”
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Figure 5: Wounded Buddhist Monk Lying Unconscious. This image a Buddhist monk lying
unconscious in the Soortee Bara Bazaar in Rangoon after injuries caused by European sergeants of
the Rangoon Police. Originally published in the New Light of Burma on 27th July 1938.

The insult to the Buddhist religion as well as the rapid publishing of
images, accessible to both the literate and illiterate, by the nationalist press
contributed to a national identity of resistance towards the British and Indians.
Another such image depicted British and Indian policemen surrounding and
approaching a panic-stricken monk (Fig. 6).272 The officers appear to be walking
very forcefully towards a monk with no way of escape or fighting back, an excess
of force. This image by itself has a similar effect to Figure Five as both attempt to
rally the Bamar Buddhists, by showing how inaction would result in minority
groups attacking sacred pongyis thus keeping the Bamar subservient to foreigners.
The image appearing in the nationalist press reiterates that Burma was to be a
Buddhist nation and that defending Buddhism from insult would be a part of a
citizen’s conscious and national civic identity. This sense of national identity
resulting from the British suppression of the 1938 Riots is evident in the caption
272
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of Figure Six from a writer in Thuriya to the British government asking how the
British administration could allow these abhorred police responses to occur. The
caption reads:
Hon’ble Home Minister, look at this picture of an accident near the
jewellery shops of the Soortee Bara Bazaar. From this can be judged the
extent of the excesses committed by the European Sergeants in yesterday’s
affairs. The Picture speaks for itself. What are two out of the four
Sergeants doing, while going straight for the two pongyis? It can be
clearly seen how terrified, terror-stricken, and recoiling with fear are those
two pongyis. Ahead of them is an Indian Constable. In fact the two
pongyis are cornered without chance of escape. Consider this.273
By directly referencing the British administration in response to its forces
insulting Buddhism and the Burmese nation, the author comes to represent the
voices of all agitated Bamar Buddhists. There is a sense of unity for the author to
so confidently express anger and ask the British to “consider this,” a terse
statement directed at the highest levels of the British administration but also
accessible to readers of Thuriya. As this was an appeal to a British and Bamar
audience, the issues listed were the gravest; therefore, criticizing British violence
against pongyis conveyed how important the protection of Buddhism was to a
Burmese civic identity. By identifying both Indian and European sergeants, the
author implied that all agents of the colonial apparatus were actively working to
what appears to be stamping out Buddhism in Burma. Specifying the role of
Indian policemen in putting down the riots is reminiscent of the reporting from
the Saya San Rebellion which generalized Indians as brutal oppressors of the
Bamar Buddhist peasants. Figure Six and its associated caption builds on the
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already established sentiment that Indians abused their “favorable position” with
the British against the Bamar Buddhists. The 1938 Riots originating in an urban
setting furthered the unifying effect of these claims as more people witnessed the
violence documented in the nationalist press. Because the Saya San Rebellion was
rural, urbanites in Rangoon would not see fallen rebels firsthand, in contrast to the
1938 Riots where witnessing violence against monks was unavoidable. The
images used by the New Light of Burma and Thuriya united the Bamar Buddhist
population into believing in a national civic identity of protecting Buddhism and
fighting the British colonial state.

Figure 6: Buddhist Monk Surrounded by Colonial Police. This image shows a Buddhist monk
surrounded by Indian constables and European sergeants near a jewelry shop in the Soortee Bara
Bazaar. Originally published in Thuriya on 27th July 1938.
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Conclusions
The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots represented a seminal moment in the
construction of a Burmese civic and ethnic national identity. It has been shown
how the mass demonstrations in Rangoon began as a reaction to passages from
Maung Shwe Hpi’s book and quickly escalated into violence against Indian
Muslims and Hindus. The contagiousness of the violence indicated that
underlying anti-Indian sentiment had permeated to all levels of the plural society
and engrained itself as a platform to which Bamar ethnic nationalism could be
refined. Bamar peasants 200 miles from Rangoon, upon hearing of the
demonstrations at the Shwedagon Pagoda, took to the streets in solidarity with
those in Rangoon rioting in the name of Buddhism and the Bamar “race.” Such a
level of comradery over the vast territory that is Burma illustrates the
development of a Burmese national identity and the emergence of a Burmese
“imagined community.” To defend Buddhism was the call to arms for Bamar
Buddhists across Burma and the scale of the reception of this ideology vindicates
that they imagined themselves as part of a nation.
While the Saya San Rebellion and the “Separation Crisis” collectively
introduced and strengthened anti-British and anti-Indian sentiment, it was in the
1938 Anti-Indian Riots where the Bamar synthesized these grievances to form a
collective national identity. While the Saya San Rebellion represented a rural
uprising against the British system and the “Separation Crisis” provided urbanites
with a chance to unleash anti-Indian rhetoric, the 1938 Riots were unique in that
both rural and urban Bamar Buddhists took to the streets to voice anti-Indian
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xenophobia and islamophobia, both products of British negligence and the
culmination of the emotions from the aforementioned case studies. The British
suppression of the Saya San Rebellion never addressed Bamar peasant grievances
over land tenure and Indian immigration, thus anti-Indian sentiment especially
stemming from the use of Indian soldiers only increased in a rural setting. Debates
over the separation of India and Burma amongst the urban elite integrated antiIndian sentiment into the discourse around preserving Bamar racial “purity” and
unity. Through the Separation Crisis, the idea of the Bamar as the race that should
determine the future of Burma became mainstream and was disseminated into the
countryside through campaign leaflets and the press. By 1938, Bamar Buddhists
across urban and rural settings felt that they were a group united by race and a
struggle against Indian co-colonialists within the British colonial system. Maung
Shwe Hpi’s book served as the spark which would ignite the anti-Indian powder
keg that was Lower Burma. However, learning from the Saya San Rebellion,
Bamar rioters knew that while confronting the British directly would never
amount to victory, violence would capture the attention of the colonial authorities.
The “Separation Crisis” showed that with the attention of the colonial authorities,
successes toward Burmese national independence could be achieved through
negotiations and legislation. The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots were the product of
ethnonationalism and religious-nationalist sentiment from the Saya San Rebellion
and “Separation Crisis” which defined dobama (“our Burma”) by demonizing
thudobama and Muslim. Using the fear of the decline of Buddhism as well as
European racial rhetoric allowed Bamar nationalists to label constructed groups of

150

people, Indian Muslims and Hindus, Zerbadis, and the British as transforming
Burma into thudo-bama. The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots established that membership
in the Burmese nation would first be restricted to members of the Bamar “race”
and Buddhist faith. To be a continual member of the Burmese nation would also
not just be limited to phenotypic characteristics, ethnicity, or even religious
affiliation; instead, the actions of the rioters in 1938 illustrated that being a citizen
of the new Burmese imagined community would require a willingness to defend
the Bamar race, the Buddhist faith, and thus the nation.
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EPILOGUE
When the Japanese Empire invaded Burma on December 23rd, 1941, the
lines of Burmese identity had been drawn. Racial, religious, and civic identity
based on being Bamar, Buddhist, and anti-Indian was so entrenched into Burmese
society that many Indian residents of Burma joined the retreating British forces.
The “[g]eneral apathy of the local people, if not hatred and envy consistently
encouraged by a section of Burmans, fear for their life, or of molestation…all
combined to compel the Indians to leave their homes and properties in Burma.”274
At the start of the war, Indians were the anathema of the Bamar majority and
joined the British retreat because it was evident that the British could not protect
the Indian community. Over 500,000 Indians fled from Burma, with between
10,000 and 100,000 perishing during the journey, illustrating that there was no
place for Indians in the newly imagined Burmese nation.275 The “Burmans (as
distinct from other races in Burma) could always claim to be a nation: a rare thing
in India until 1947” and by “December 1941, Indians in Burma had clearly
understood that they would always be regarded as aliens.”276 We began this thesis
by analyzing rural anti-Chettiar sentiment during the Saya San Rebellion and
traced how concurrent urban anti-Indian feelings during the “Separation Crisis”
transformed the Burmese nationalist movement into an increasingly monolithic
anti-Indian movement with the separation of Burma and India in 1937. By
framing the Indian minority as an "out-group," the Bamar ethnonationalists
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defined being a member of the Bamar Buddhist majority as the foundation of
Burmese identity. The indiscriminate anti-Indian violence across urban and rural
townships during the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots asserted this new Burmese identity.
These years of compounding xenophobia and the catalyst of the Japanese invasion
culminated in the Indian exodus from Burma in 1941. While the war had a great
impact on the development of new Burmese political factions, which would
become influential in antebellum politics, the idea of what it meant to be Burmese
was firmly entrenched by 1941.
The tenets of Burmese national identity from the colonial era continue to
manifest themselves today through the language used to “justify” the Rohingya
Genocide. Nationalists in Myanmar portray the Rohingya as Indian through the
terms “Bengali” and “Kala,” to suggest that the Rohingya, who are indigenous to
Myanmar's Rakhine State, are foreign invaders looking to replace the Burmese
people. The terms “Bengali” and "Kala" distinctly characterize the Rohingya as
racially “Indian,” evoking the colonial idea of “Indian-ness” being the antithesis
of “Burmese-ness." Studying the evolution of Burmese identity from the colonial
era allows a modern scholar to understand why contemporary Burmese identity is
hostile to the Rohingya. The three case studies examined in this thesis constitute
expressions of Burmese identity through the lens of religion, race, and action,
which modern Burmese nationalists weaponize against the Rohingya.
Calls for anti-Rohingya violence from Buddhist monks (pongyis) is a
compelling example of how Buddhism continues to be a tenet of modern Burmese
identity. Islamophobia is a key driver of the Rohingya Genocide. In 2017 a
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Buddhist monk phrased it as follows: “I am only warning people about Muslims.
Consider it like if you had a dog, that would bark at strangers coming to your
house––it is to warn you. I am like that dog. I bark.” From this example it become
clear that pongyis deliberately dehumanize the Rohingya on account of their
religion.277 The roots of this commitment to Buddhism as a key part of Burmese
national identity can be found in the Saya San Rebellion, our first case study.
Saya San’s followers bravely charged British machine guns due to their faith in
charms, tattoos, and Burmese Buddhism; and their discontent about losing land to
Chettiar moneylenders. Defending the Buddhist religion as the call to arms for
independence embodies the significance of Buddhism to Burmese national
identity.
Meanwhile, the Islamophobia of the pongyis during the 1938 Anti-Indian
Riots mirror the rhetoric and action taken by Buddhist monks against the
Rohingya today. Burmese Buddhist perceptions that Muslims were “leeching” off
the land and “insulting” Buddhism caused many pongyis to take up knives and
murder Indian Muslims in 1938 in the same manner that pongyis dehumanize the
Rohingya in the present. The modern rhetoric used by the Myanmar government
to demonize the Rohingya characterizes them as “interlopers, stealing land and
economic opportunities, with the eventual goal of overthrowing Buddhism as the
country’s majority religion.”278 This rhetoric parallels that of the 1938 Anti-Indian
Riots which accuses Muslims of covertly setting up a Dobama Muslim (“our
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Burma-Muslim”) community or turning Buddhist Burma into a Muslim Burma.
The islamophobia driving the Rohingya Genocide is thus not a modern
phenomenon, the false notion that Muslims constituted a fifth column in Burmese
society has its origins in the colonial era and was integral in the Burmese
nationalist project of the late 1930s. We have witnessed through the 1938 AntiIndian Riots that Islamophobia was a convenient tool for uniting a Bamar
Buddhist “in-group” by demonizing an ethnic and religious minority “out-group.”
The Rohingya are victims of colonial-era Islamophobia used to unite the Bamar
Buddhists in the fight for Burmese independence.
The contemporary Bamar Buddhist majority use racialization of the
Bamar ethnicity and the exclusionary rhetoric of a “Burma for the Burmans and
not for Indians” from colonial Burma in framing the Rohingya as a foreign threat.
One Rohingya man, named Bodru, recalls that “they said ‘Kalar’ [a racial slur].
Then they said ‘Bengali.’ At last, they said ‘intruder.’”279 Kala used as a racial
slur against the Rohingya parallels its use against Indians both during the
Separation Crisis and the 1938 Anti-Indian Riots as a way to easily reinforce the
idea that Indians and Indian Muslims, in particular, did not belong in the Burmese
nation. Kala in its etymological form broadly means South Asian but since the
colonial era has become a pejorative. This transformation of a common term into
a slur based on a person’s regional origin illustrates the stigma towards Indians in
both colonial and contemporary Myanmar. We see that the persisting
characterization of a group as “Indian” to dehumanize them comes from the anti-
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Indian sentiments of colonial Burma. Contemporary Burmese identity continues
to include an anti-Indian element and Bodru describes how “they are making us
valueless” by using descriptors such as “Kalar” and “Bengali.” Thus, the antiIndian sentiment of Burma’s colonial past has fueled the Rohingya Genocide.
The anti-Indian component of Burmese identity carried an aspect of
action, being Burmese also meant defending dobama (our Burma), and calls for
pogroms against the Rohingya reflect the continuing relevance of Burma’s
colonial history. Anti-Rohingya sentiment in the Burmese press not only carries
the power to dehumanize but also call for mob violence. The article titled “The
Thorn Needs Removing if it Pierces,” published in The Global New Light of
Myanmar, “urged the Buddhist government to take action against the Rohingya”
by comparing them to a “thorn.”280 A thorn will continue to cause pain and even
infection unless removed; by characterizing the Rohingya as a "thorn" there is a
clear call to action for the “removal" of the Rohingya. The 1938 Anti-Indian Riots
where the headline in the vernacular press was “BUDDHISM HAS BEEN
INSULTED, TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS,” expressed that taking part in
collective reactions as a part of Burmese civic identity developed during the
colonial era. Both the ongoing Rohingya Genocide and the 1938 Anti-Indian
Riots convey that "Burmese-ness" is partly characterized by taking action to
preserve a Bamar Buddhist state.
While the majority of Burmese neither welcome nor recognize the
existence of the Rohingya ethnicity, some experts argue that this xenophobia
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began as a result of ultranationalist policies after General Ne Win seized power in
a coup in 1962. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum highlights that in the 1970s
the Ne Win government slowly began to escalate the alienation of the Rohingya,
first by confiscating their National ID cards, which provided proof of citizenship.
This culminated in a 1982 law that based citizenship on ethnicity and excluded
the Rohingya, using the term “Bengali" to describe them. While Ne Win’s
“government would come to be defined by policies that protected the Buddhist
Bamar,” the anti-Indian and Islamophobia of the 1930s did not simply disappear
in the years between Burmese independence in 1948 and Ne Win’s coup in
1962.281 The term “Bengali,” could only dehumanize the Rohingya if the Bamar
Buddhist majority already held strong anti-Indian sentiments, which they did. Ne
Win’s anti-Rohingya and pro-Bamar Buddhist policies were successful because
Burmese national identity, developed in response to British rule, was already
defined by being a Bamar Buddhist. Even after Ne Win’s regime, many Burmese
citizens have either supported or been indifferent to the continuing
dehumanization of the Rohingya using language from colonial Burma. Therefore,
Ne Win did not create the anti-Rohingya sentiment, he merely capitalized on the
underlying bigotry with colonial origins and used that for his own machinations.
The perception of the Rohingya as “other” emerged from the rhetoric of the
Bamar nationalists of the colonial era.
Through this thesis project, I have traced the development of Burmese
national identity through three case studies and examined their lasting
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implications in fueling the Rohingya Genocide. It is my goal to have shown how
the idea of being Burmese is one of pride for many people, pride in resisting the
British, pride in the Buddhist religion, pride in Bamar ethnicity, and pride in
having one’s own nation. While it was Bamar nationalists who espoused antiIndian rhetoric in colonial Burma, such action was a product of British
oppression. However, nationalism has consequences and the parallels in the
rhetoric used by modern and colonial-era Burmese nationalists to characterize the
Rohingya and Indian minorities respectively, convey how the scars of colonialism
have not healed in Myanmar.
After analyzing the development of an exclusionary Burmese national
identity, it is important to note that discrimination is not inherent to “Burmeseness.” We have seen how in both colonial and contemporary Myanmar,
nationalist politicians and the state government largely dictated the pillars of what
it meant to be Burmese through propagandistic messaging. While the Rohingya
Genocide illustrates that many Burmese have subscribed to their government's
rhetoric, a wave of solidarity between Bamar Buddhists and ethnic minority rebels
in the wake of the 2021 Myanmar Coup brings hope that there will be a mutual
rapprochement between the Bamar Buddhist majority and Myanmar’s ethnic
minorities. Burmese identity is constantly evolving but my research shows that
Myanmar’s colonial legacies are difficult to expunge.
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